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ESSAY
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS
Shyamkrishna Balganesh*
Should copyright infringement claims be treated as marketable
assets? Copyright law has long emphasized the free and independent
alienability of its exclusive rights. Yet, the right to sue for infringement—which copyright law grants authors in order to render its exclusive rights operational—has never been thought of as independently
assignable, or indeed as the target of investments by third parties. As a
result, discussions of copyright law and policy rarely consider the possibility of an acquisition or investment market emerging for actionable
copyright claims and the advantages that such a market might hold for
copyright’s goals, objectives, and functioning. This Essay analyzes the
opportunities and challenges presented by an independent market for
copyright claims, and argues that copyright law, policy, and practice
would stand to benefit from the regulated involvement of third parties in
acquiring, financing, bringing, and defending infringement claims.
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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of third parties acquiring, financing, or investing
in private litigation has seen a sharp increase in the last few years.1 Large
commercial disputes, previously thought to be immune to any third party
involvement, are today the principal targets for such involvement. In the
process, rather robust claim markets have begun to emerge in various
substantive areas.2 Despite this general trend, the copyright system
remains resistant to the role of third parties in acquiring and bringing
infringement claims. The perceived one-sidedness of the system, which
favors large commercial enterprises at the cost of individual user-defendants, and the general tendency among defendants to avoid litigating the
question of fair use are together thought to render copyright litigation
something of an evil that ought to be avoided unless absolutely
necessary.3 Allowing third parties to bring claims independently is, in this
climate, seen as anathema. Copyright law thus contains stringent rules of
1. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural
Problem, 99 Geo. L.J. 65, 96 (2010) (describing “recent development in litigation finance”
where “investment funds and investment banks have begun to buy interests in commercial
lawsuits”); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95
Minn. L. Rev. 1268, 1275–85 (2011) [hereinafter Steinitz, Whose Claim?] (describing
recent trend of third party litigation funding); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in
Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 571, 573 (2010)
(“[B]y early 2010, there were at least six companies, both public and private, in three
countries, that focused primarily on litigation finance, and that purported to have
investments in U.S. commercial litigation.”).
2. See Steinitz, Whose Claim?, supra note 1, at 1277 (“[T]he recent trend [in third
party funding] is aimed at very different markets: corporate litigants, including corporate
defendants, classes . . . , and individual plaintiffs in non-personal injury cases.”).
3. For an analysis of how this affects the behavior of litigants, see Jennifer E.
Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1899,
1909–24 (2007) (describing practices that participants—primarily potential defendants—
adopt in order to avoid costly copyright litigation).
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standing that courts all too readily invoke and extend in order to keep
third parties out of the system.4
This tendency to view copyright litigation as an active hindrance that
needs to be curbed has only been exacerbated by the recent public
outcry against “copyright trolls,” entities that seek to profit from litigation
by monetizing it.5 While the disquiet originated in the palpably problematic context of entities that merely sought to take advantage of copyright’s statutory damages regime,6 it has since extended to just about any
effort to profit from copyright litigation, regardless of the legitimacy of
the underlying claim itself. Copyright litigation is thus seen as deserving
avoidance, and third parties’ involvement therein is in turn viewed as
doubly problematic and frowned upon.
This Essay argues that this approach is both myopic and counterproductive. Courts, scholars, and policymakers have for far too long
believed that meaningful reform in the copyright system needs to occur
through copyright doctrine, be it at the legislative level or through
judicial interpretation.7 In the process, they have ignored the possibility
that market forces, if regulated and channeled appropriately, could do
just as well and in certain respects perhaps even better than traditional
law reform efforts. This is precisely what a regulated market for actionable copyright claims promises to do for copyright law. And contrary to
popular belief, the increased involvement of third parties in the copy-

4. The rigidity originates in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Silvers v. Sony Pictures
Entertainment, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding “bare
assignment of an accrued cause of action is impermissible” under copyright laws); see also
3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12.02 (2012) [hereinafter
Nimmer on Copyright] (discussing standing to sue for copyright violations).
5. See, e.g., Copyright Trolls, Elec. Frontier Found., https://www.eff.org/issues/
copyright-trolls (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 15, 2013)
(identifying “harms of copyright trolling” and expressing outrage at trolls’ “disrespect for
due process”); Parker Higgins, Trouble in Trolltown: Judges Increasingly Catching On to
Copyright Trolls’ Unfair Tactics, Elec. Frontier Found.: Deeplinks Blog (Apr. 14, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/trouble-trolltown (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“[Trolls are] victimizing Internet users at large.”); Mike Masnick, Rapidshare
Countersues Perfect 10 for Being a ‘Copyright Troll’ Who Only ‘Shakes Down’ Others,
Techdirt (June 14, 2010, 7:46 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100614/01050
19802.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing lawsuit against copyright
troll); About, Fight Copyright Trolls, http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/about/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 13, 2012) (describing copyright trolls as “law
firms or individual lawyers who adopt[] a lucrative scheme to profit from copyright
infringement allegations through extortion”).
6. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls,
86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 723 (2013) [hereinafter Balganesh, Uneasy Case] (arguing copyright
trolls disrupt balance in copyright enforcement by enforcing otherwise actionable but
tolerated claims).
7. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 53–55 (2010)
(noting reform will have to come through legislative process even though Congress is
unlikely to undertake such reform efforts in near future).
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right system will inure to the benefit of both plaintiffs and defendants in
copyright infringement actions.
Copyright litigation today exhibits obvious malaises that litigation
funding is well placed to correct. Litigating a copyright claim is no longer
an affordable prospect for a vast majority of authors and creators. As of
2011, the average cost of litigating a copyright infringement case through
trial, for either plaintiff or defendant—excluding judgment and
awards—was estimated to range from $384,000 to a staggering $2
million.8 To individual, small-business, or noncommercial creators, all of
whom are intended beneficiaries of copyright, copyright litigation
remains an unaffordable proposition. On the defendant side, users and
copiers of creative works are, for identical reasons, all too reluctant to
defend themselves in court when threatened with an infringement
lawsuit, and go to extreme lengths to avoid the risk of being sued, even
when their actions are fully defensible under copyright’s fair use
doctrine.9 Needless licenses, clearances, and permissions—which are
expensive, but cost less than litigation—are the norm today among users
and copiers, even when wholly unnecessary as a legal matter, and they
are often motivated entirely by the impulse to avoid costly litigation.10
The costs of copyright litigation thus have a distortionary effect on
copyright law and policy. On the one hand, these costs hinder the
system’s purported ability to function as an incentive for creativity.11 If
creators and authors recognize that enforcing their copyright claims in
court is an unworkable prospect (i.e., for cost reasons), copyright law’s
ability to induce creative expression begins to automatically diminish.
Simultaneously, the costs also render copyright law’s safety valves—such
as the fair use doctrine and other limitations and exceptions to exclusive
rights—meaningless, with defendants rarely invoking them (given their

8. Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Economic Survey 2011, at 35
(2012) (outlining costs associated with litigation). Much of this cost is attributable to the
fact-intensive nature of copyright litigation, which entails extensive discovery during the
litigation process.
9. See See Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put
Balance Back in Copyright 5 (2011) (describing this as “culture of fear and doubt”); James
Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882,
887–906 (2007) [hereinafter Gibson, Risk Aversion] (“[Various] factors cause copyright
users to seek licenses even when they have a good fair use claim—i.e., even when
proceeding unlicensed would probably result in no liability.”).
10. See, e.g., Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. Times (Oct.
16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/movies/16rams.html?pagewanted=print
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing anecdotal evidence of this practice in
documentary filmmaking).
11. For an overview of copyright’s dominant incentives rationale, see Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1577–81
(2009) [hereinafter Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright] (describing copyright incentives in theory and practice).
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dependence on a judicial determination), but instead actively undermining them through their litigation-avoidance strategies.12
Allowing third parties to enter copyright litigation and acquire,
fund, or insure infringement claims—in a regulated manner—presents
copyright law with a plausible solution. Third party entry is likely to lower
the cost of litigation for participants in the system, in the process allowing both creators and users to focus more directly on their production
and use of creative expression.13 In addition, the entry of third parties
will also produce a host of indirect benefits for the copyright system, as
seen and predicted in other substantive areas where their participation is
permitted. Indeed, third party funding (and acquisition) of litigation
claims has begun to gain prominence in jurisdictions around the world,
principally because the practice is believed to benefit litigants’ access to
justice via courts—an expensive proposition—without overwhelming the
court system.
This Essay will show how copyright law, practice, and theory would
all benefit from allowing third parties to fund infringement claims and
defenses through diverse mechanisms and devices. Part I sets out the
emerging practice of allowing third parties to acquire, fund, invest in, or
insure against private legal claims and shows how the practice is absent in
copyright litigation. Part II makes the theoretical case for more third
party involvement in copyright litigation. It analyzes how the copyright
system embodies certain features that make it a viable target for claim
markets, and shows how copyright law, practice, and policy are likely to
benefit through the greater involvement of third party funding in copyright litigation. Part III then examines the possible mechanics of a
market for copyright claims, and the forms in which third parties can be
involved. It then details the obstacles that exist under current law and
policy to the emergence of such a market and the changes that will need
to be made to induce greater participation of third parties in copyright
litigation.
I. THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND ITS ABSENCE IN COPYRIGHT
LITIGATION
The practice of third parties involving themselves in private litigation—also known as litigation funding—has seen a sharp increase in the
last few years.14 The industry is still in its early stages in the United States
but is predicted to grow rapidly in the next few years as courts, state legis12. See Gibson, Risk Aversion, supra note 9, at 888–906 (describing “license, don’t
litigate” tendency in copyright law).
13. See infra Part II.B (discussing benefits to copyright from such funding).
14. See, e.g., Steinitz, Whose Claim?, supra note 1, at 1275 (describing this trend);
Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. Times (Nov.
14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html?pagewanted
=print (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same).
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latures, and local bar associations begin to relax the several restrictions
that surround the practice.15
Litigation funding, broadly speaking, refers to the practice of
“providing money to a party to pursue a potential or filed lawsuit.”16 Put
simply, “it is the provision of funds by companies who have no other
connection with the litigation” than with its outcome.17 Such funding can
be on either the plaintiff or defendant side. In the former, it allows
claims to be brought in court by providing the necessary capital, and in
the latter, it enables defendants to defend against claims without having
to settle earlier than necessary.18 Recent estimates put the U.S. market for
litigation funding at about $1 billion, and most predict that it is likely to
grow rapidly in the next few years.19
As a practice, though, litigation funding is hardly new to the United
States. Since at least the 1990s, lawyers and law firms have provided loans
to clients who needed to bring expensive lawsuits, often at extremely
high interest rates.20 Their focus was on individual plaintiffs bringing
personal injury claims. Whereas these early practices were on a small
scale, and largely ad hoc, the last few years have seen the entry of large
investment firms into the practice.21 In addition to having significantly
15. RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Third-Party Litigation Funding and Claim Transfer:
Trends and Implications for the Civil Justice System 18 (Geoffrey McGovern et al. eds.,
2010) (predicting ethics rules will change to accommodate development of third party
financing structures); Appelbaum, supra note 14 (noting growing number of states are
eliminating bans on investor funding).
16. State & Policy Affairs Dep’t, Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., Third-Party Litigation
Funding: Tipping the Scales of Justice for Profit 1 (2011), available at http://
www.namic.org/pdf/publicpolicy/1106_thirdPartyLitigation.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
17. Steinitz, Whose Claim?, supra note 1, at 1276.
18. Id.
19. U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: ThirdParty Litigation Funding in the United States 1 (2009), available at http://ilr.iwssites.com/
uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“Third-party litigation financing is a growing phenomenon in the United States . . . .”);
Appelbaum, supra note 14 (“Total investments in lawsuits at any given time now exceed $1
billion, several industry participants estimated.”).
20. N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011) [hereinafter N.Y.C.
Bar Opinion], available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2011opinions/1159-formal-opinion-2011-02 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Third
party litigation financing first emerged as an industry in the United States in the early
1990s, when a handful of small lenders began providing cash advances to plaintiffs
involved in contingency fee litigation.”); Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing
Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 Fordham J. Corp.
& Fin. L. 55, 55 (2004) (“Lending money to plaintiffs to finance their lawsuits has become
an industry within the last ten years.”).
21. See Steinitz, Whose Claim?, supra note 1, at 1277 (“The new industry . . . is
populated by institutional investors including some very prominent and sophisticated
firms such as the leading Swiss bank, Credit Suisse, and the German insurance giant,
Allianz.”).
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larger amounts of capital, these new entrants choose to invest in large
commercial litigation (rather than personal injury claims) involving
corporate entities—either as plaintiff or defendant. Both “the number
and types of lawsuits financed” and indeed the “financing provided” have
grown dramatically,22 causing some scholars to refer to this as the
“second-wave” of litigation funding in the United States.23
This growth is often attributed to two factors: international competitive pressures and the rising cost of litigation. Other common law jurisdictions—mostly notably the United Kingdom and Australia—have come
to actively encourage the practice, and put in place a host of regulations
to allow claim markets to develop and grow there. In Australia, the
practice was formally approved in 2006 by the High Court.24 Courts in
the United Kingdom soon followed suit, and in 2011 a U.K. organization
adopted a Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders to govern and
regulate the practice.25 The exponential rise of civil litigation costs is well
known in the United States.26 A recent estimate puts the cost of bringing
a civil claim in federal court at $15,000 and the cost of defending a claim
at $20,000 with both rising to well over $100,000 depending on subject
matter.27
Broadly speaking, a third party’s involvement in litigation can work
in three possible ways: (i) through an outright claim acquisition, (ii)
through investment in or funding of the litigation, or (iii) as “after the
event” insurance on the defendant’s side.28 In a claim acquisition, the
third party purchases the actionable claim in its entirety from the original plaintiff.29 It is therefore also referred to as a “claim transfer.”30 In a
22. N.Y.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 20.
23. Steinitz, Whose Claim?, supra note 1, at 1277; see also Holly E. Loiseau, Eric C.
Lyttle & Brianna N. Benfield, Third-Party Financing of Commercial Litigation, In-House
Litigator, Summer 2010, at 1, 7 (“[L]itigation financing is increasingly being utilized in
commercial litigation between businesses, such as lawsuits involving breach of contract,
intellectual property, fraud, or price-fixing.”).
24. Campbells Cash & Carry Pty. Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.).
25. Ass’n of Litig. Funders of Eng. & Wales, Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders
(2011), available at http://www.calunius.com/media/2540/alf%20code%20of%20
practice.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
26. See generally Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of
Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 Duke L.J. 765 (2010) (discussing high costs of civil
litigation and analyzing how discovery rules affect costs).
27. Id. at 770 (discussing findings of earlier empirical study authors conducted); see,
e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 14 (noting cost can rise to over $100,000 for malpractice
cases).
28. For a fuller elaboration of these alternatives as they apply to copyright law, see
infra Part III. It is worth mentioning here that these categories are not necessarily watertight and are largely for explanatory purposes. A claim acquisition is thus in a sense an
investment as well. Additionally, “after the event” insurance is in the end a form of insurance rather than investment or funding, which entails its own regulatory framework and
requirements.
29. RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, supra note 15, at 11.
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wide variety of subject areas, a complete acquisition confers standing to
sue on the acquirer, allowing it to dictate the litigation and settlement
strategy unilaterally.31 In a litigation investment, the third party funds
(i.e., invests in) a litigation by fronting capital to the plaintiff for litigation and related expenses in return for a percentage of any eventual
recovery through judgment or settlement.32 Here, the plaintiff remains in
the picture and litigates in its own name, but the parties usually enter
into complex arrangements to determine who controls the litigation.33
The third form of funding operates on the defendant’s side, and involves
a third party purchasing a defendant’s litigation risk after a claim has
commenced. In effect, this operates as a form of insurance after an event
has occurred, but where the magnitude of risk remains uncertain—
hence its description as a form of “after-the-event insurance.”34 This form
of funding is less common in the United States than the other two,
especially since U.S. law does not allow fee-shifting by prevailing defendants, unlike in the United Kingdom, where this practice is well known.35
Each of these forms of third party funding carries over rather well to the
unique circumstances of copyright litigation, which is discussed in
greater detail later.
All three forms of funding facilitate the creation of “claim markets,”
as the term is used here. While technically it is only in a claim acquisition
that the third party takes a formal ownership stake in the claim, litigation
investment and insurance too involve transferring the risk of litigation—
either in part or in full—to the third party. While the third party may not
obtain a formal ownership stake, it nonetheless alienates the risk that
litigating the claim entails through a market mechanism.

30. Id.
31. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289 (2008) (holding
assignees of legal claims have standing under federal law to commence actions).
32. N.Y.C. Bar Opinion, supra note 20 (“If the claim appears meritorious, the
financing company will advance amounts to cover attorneys fees and the other costs of the
litigation. These advances typically are made to the claimant or its outside litigation
counsel, in return for a percentage of any eventual recovery.” (footnote omitted)).
33. Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 455, 503–
15 (2012) [hereinafter Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract] (detailing complex finance
and control structure of third party litigation).
34. Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367, 380 & n.26
(2009) [hereinafter Molot, Market in Litigation Risk] (discussing English practice wherein
parties buy insurance after lawsuit commences to cover opponent’s legal fees in event they
should lose and be burdened with these fees under rules of fee-shifting); see also Michael
Faure & Jef De Mot, Comparing Third-Party Financing of Litigation and Legal Expenses
Insurance, 8 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 743, 746 (2012) (“[After-the-event] insurance covers future
legal expenses in a case where an incident has already occurred, such as an accident that
has caused an injury.”).
35. See Philip S. Figa, The “American Rule” Has Outlived Its Usefulness: Adopt the
“English Rule,” Nat’l L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 13 (differentiating between American and
English rules of fee-shifting).
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Despite these trends, copyright litigation has remained by and large
immune to third party involvement. Copyright litigation costs well over
three times the already high average cost of litigation.36 And yet, marketbased solutions to the problem of copyright’s litigation costs have been
somewhat rare. Unlike in the patent context, where nonpracticing
entities (NPEs) are known to acquire patents preemptively and then sue
for infringement,37 copyright trades rarely occur in active anticipation of
future litigation.38 Contingency fee-based arrangements in copyright
litigation are rare.39 So too are collective enforcement mechanisms,
where individual rights-holders band together to collectively monitor and
enforce their rights, thereby cross-subsidizing their litigation costs.40
II. THE BENEFITS OF A MARKET FOR COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
Having discussed how litigation funding operates and its failure—
thus far—to influence copyright litigation, this Part examines what the
copyright system stands to gain through such funding, which effectively
would result in the creation of a market for copyright claims. It bears
reemphasizing that the reference to a “market for claims” here includes
not just situations where the claim is acquired in its entirety, but also
those where third parties assume a portion of the risk associated with
enforcing the claim by investing in or funding it directly.

36. See Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, supra note 8, at 35 (detailing median cost
of copyright litigation from 2005 to 2011).
37. See generally Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 457 (2012)
(discussing NPEs, also known as “patent trolls”).
38. It is sometimes mistakenly believed that patent infringement claims can be transferred and assigned independent of the patent itself. See RAND Inst. for Civil Justice,
supra note 15, at 12 (“Patent claims are transferable under federal law.”). This is incorrect.
Patent infringement claims, such as those for past infringement, can be transferred only
when accompanied by a transfer or assignment of the patent itself. See Crown Die & Tool
Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 43 (1923) (“The sole exception to the rule
that only he who is the owner of the patent . . . can sue for damages . . . is when such
owner assigns the patent and also the claim for past infringements to the same person.”); 8
Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 21.03[2][g][i] (2011) (“The damage claim
cannot be transferred as such apart from the patent.”); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F.
Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 Tul. L.
Rev. 1323, 1344 (2000) (“The assignor . . . may transfer . . . only if the transfer is express
and is accompanied by an assignment of the underlying patent.” (footnote omitted)). The
rules of patent law are in this respect strikingly similar to those of copyright law. See infra
Part III.B.2.a (explaining how courts have interpreted copyright claims to be
nonassignable).
39. Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Notice of Inquiry, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,758,
66,759 (Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Remedies for Small Copyright Claims Notice]
(“Contingency fee arrangements are relatively rare in copyright lawsuits . . . .”).
40. See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of
Fashion, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1193 (2009) (advocating collective enforcement mechanism for fashion industry).
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This Part first looks at certain structural realities of the copyright
entitlement and litigation, to highlight the need for such third party
litigation funding (Part II.A), then proceeds to show how the entry of
third party funders can provide copyright litigation with a host of direct
and indirect benefits on both the plaintiff and defendant sides (Part
II.B).
A. Why the Copyright System Is Ripe for Litigation Funding
While copyright litigation is no doubt very similar to traditional
commercial litigation as a structural matter, it nonetheless embodies
certain characteristics that make it well suited to the practice of litigation
funding. Two in particular deserve elaboration here: (i) the copyright
entitlement’s fundamental dependence on litigation, and (ii) the exorbitant cost of copyright litigation (in comparison to other areas) and its
distortionary effects on copyright law and policy. In some ways the two
features are clearly at odds with each other, and copyright reform efforts
have thus far done little to try to align them.
Copyright law’s basic entitlement structure anticipates and operates
in the shadow of private litigation. As an analytical matter, copyright
grants its holder a set of exclusive rights in relation to the protected
subject matter, i.e., the original expression.41 These rights revolve around
the act of copying, which is central to copyright law. All the same, since
copyright’s subject matter is intangible and therefore exhibits the characteristics of resource nonrivalry and nonexcludability,42 the significance of
the exclusive rights machinery operates in large part through the correlative duty that it imposes on others.43 Copyright thus revolves around the
“duty not to copy original expression” that it imposes on all but the copyright owner in society.44
In other words, ownership over a tangible object endows its owner
with a set of exclusive rights to use the object. Yet, since the object is both
rival and excludable in nature, these rights enable the owner to use the
object in different ways without interference from others in society (i.e.,
41. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
42. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood
Relation, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635, 637 (2007) (defining nonrivalry as situation where
“consumption of the good by one consumer does not reduce the supply available for
consumption by others” and nonexcludability as phenomenon where “producers cannot
provide their benefits to one consumer without simultaneously providing the benefits to
other consumers”).
43. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law:
Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1664, 1669 (2012) [hereinafter
Balganesh, Obligatory Structure] (“The duty of forbearance, which operates once a
resource is owned, signals to individuals to avoid interfering with the resource without the
owner’s authorization.”).
44. Id. at 1667–74; see also Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual
Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 841, 844 (1993)
(discussing correlativity of individual rights and individual duties in intellectual property).
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nonowners). Moving to copyright though, since the object is intangible
expression, the owner (the copyright holder) needs no actual enablement to use the object.45 As a physical matter, the object is perfectly
capable of multiple, simultaneous use (and copying) by other individuals. Copyright injects an artificial scarcity into this environment through
its grant of exclusive rights. But given the nonrival nature of the object
being protected, these exclusive rights disable nonowners (i.e., potential
copiers) from interfering with the copyright holder’s exclusive rights in
the work.46 Copyright’s entitlement framework is therefore rooted in the
disabling duties that it imposes on nonowners in society. And since copyright is in the end a private law system, for this disablement it relies
heavily on the owner’s power, ability, and threat to invoke the state’s
coercive machinery to ensure its realization. The copyright entitlement
then, to put it simply, revolves analytically around the possibility of litigation.
As a functional matter, the copyright entitlement is formally determined for the first time only during litigation. Since the entitlement is
premised on automatic protection once a work is created and fixed in a
tangible medium of expression, litigation performs an important validation function for the existence and scope of the entitlement.47 Unlike the
patent entitlement, which involves a formal prosecution process that
results in the patentee obtaining a prima facie entitlement accompanied
by a strong presumption of validity, copyright law contains no analogous
review process.48 Litigation thus performs more than just a remedial
function in copyright law—i.e., merely correcting a harm—but instead
also performs an important constitutive function for the entitlement.

45. See T. Cyprian Williams, Property, Things in Action and Copyright, 11 L.Q.R.
223, 232 (1895) (making similar point about centrality of forbearance to copyright law).
46. See Balganesh, Obligatory Structure, supra note 43, at 1670 (“[C]opyright law
does not just declare that the rightholder is allowed to copy . . . but instead allows the
rightholder to copy to the exclusion of everyone else.”); Williams, supra note 45, at 226 (discussing how law protects individual rights by imposing individual duties).
47. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118
Yale L.J. 1126, 1168–70 (2009) (book review) (describing this validation function as
bipolar process by which courts define copyright entitlement by reference to plaintiff’s
contribution and defendant’s actions).
48. For a recent account of this difference, see David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur,
Costly Intellectual Property, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 677, 679 (2012) (“Patents vest only after an
applicant successfully navigates a cumbersome examination process administered by the
federal Patent and Trademark Office (‘PTO’). Copyrights, by contrast, arise costlessly and
often unintentionally, as soon as an author fixes a work of authorship in a tangible
medium of expression.”). This is not to suggest that the patent entitlement is not subject
to the vagaries of the litigation process as well, rendering it problematic. See Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 2005, at 75, 75
(“Given [the uncertainties of patent entitlement], economists have increasingly
recognized that a patent does not confer . . . the right to exclude but rather a right to try
to exclude by asserting the patent in court.”).
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There remains an important respect in which copyright is also
different from the entitlement underlying other private causes of action
such as those involved in tort claims. While such private claims too are
determined only during litigation (i.e., by a court), the abstract entitlements underlying them are almost never treated as alienable prior to
their maturation into specific actions. Thus, it is uncommon to speak of
trading (or transferring away) one’s “right not to be negligently injured,”
prior to a negligent act actually transpiring.49 Copyright, on the other
hand, is treated as a tradable entitlement, even in its unmatured form,
making it analytically very different.50
Indeed, the copyright entitlement’s tradability in its unmatured
form and its fundamental dependency on litigation caused some early
scholars of the common law to argue that copyright was nothing more
than a “chose in action,” i.e., an actionable claim.51 Since expression
could never be “possessed” as an object, copyright was thought to be a
“claim” that could “only be enforced by going to law.”52 Since all forms of
property in the common law were choses in either action or possession,
and copyright was clearly intended to be a tradable asset, this view
insisted that a copyright claim had to be understood as a chose in action.
Thus, as a structural matter, copyright law fundamentally anticipates and
depends on the possibility of litigation. Unlike other substantive areas
where litigation can be seen as performing a vindicatory, remedial, or
punitive function, litigation is of constitutive analytical significance to
copyright law.
This analytical reality, however, faces an obvious functional problem.
In spite of the centrality of litigation to copyright’s entitlement structure,
copyright litigation remains unaffordable to a large number of litigants.
The average cost of litigating a copyright case through trial ranges from
$384,000 to over $2 million, for both plaintiffs and defendants.53 These
costs have risen dramatically over the last decade, which has in turn seen
a corresponding reduction in the number of copyright claims that are
actually litigated in court. In 2005, a total of 5,796 new copyright cases

49. See Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 Va. L. Rev.
383, 383 (1989) (defining entitlement prior to injury as “unmatured tort claim”); see also
Alan Schwartz, Commentary on “Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims”: A Long
Way Yet to Go, 75 Va. L. Rev. 423, 423–24 (1989) (describing problems inherent in allowing such claims to be traded).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2012) (dealing with process through which copyright in work
may be transferred, i.e., traded).
51. See Williams, supra note 45, at 223 (“[C]opyrights and similar rights are more
analogous to choses in action than to choses in possession . . . .”).
52. Id. at 226.
53. Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, supra note 8, at 35; see also Rothman, supra
note 3, at 1909 (describing these costs as “skyrocketing”).
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were filed.54 This figure has seen a steady decline since, and by 2011 this
figure shrank to 2,297—an astounding sixty percent drop.55 The
Copyright Office attributes most of this to the rise in litigation costs, and
in 2011 it began exploring the possibility of low-cost “small claims” courts
to decide copyright infringement cases.56 It thus observed the following:
If a copyright owner hires a lawyer, the expenses can add up
quickly. Contingency fee arrangements are relatively rare in
copyright lawsuits; thus most copyright owners will have to pay
an hourly fee for representation. Lawyers charge hundreds of
dollars per hour, which could reach a total of tens or hundreds
of thousands of dollars when a case does not immediately settle
and instead requires discovery, motion practice, and trial.57
What makes copyright litigation expensive is the necessarily factintensive nature of the dispute. In bringing a claim, a plaintiff must show
actual copying by the defendant, which entails proof of access and
similarity between the works. If the works are not identical, the plaintiff
also needs to establish that the works are “substantially similar,” which is
a subjective question of fact.58 Courts treat both these issues as questions
of fact, and are justifiably reluctant to decide them on motions for
summary judgment.59 The defendant faces the same fact-intensive
burden. Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, and the burden of
establishing the facts that determine fair use, most notably the “effect” of
the defendant’s use on the market for the plaintiff’s work,60 falls to the
defendant.61 Discovery costs thus form a large part of copyright litigants’
expenses.62
54. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2006 Judicial Business of the United States
Courts: Annual Report of the Director 167 (2007) (detailing filing statistics from 2002
through 2006).
55. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts:
2011 Annual Report of the Director 130 (2012) (detailing filing statistics from 2007
through 2011).
56. Remedies for Small Copyright Claims Notice, supra note 39, at 66,759.
57. Id. at 66,759–60.
58. Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62
Duke L.J. 203, 284 (2012) [hereinafter Balganesh, Normativity of Copying] (extolling
subjectivity of substantial similarity for pluralist reasons).
59. See, e.g., Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 946 (8th Cir.
1992) (observing summary judgment on issue of substantial similarity is generally not
favored); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1165 (9th Cir. 1977) (observing “summary judgment may not be granted when there is the
slightest doubt” on issue).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
61. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (“[F]air
use is an affirmative defense . . . .”); 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 4, § 13-05[A][4]
(detailing problems associated with having defendant bear this burden).
62. See Sharon Cullars, Trends in IP Litigation Costs, Legal Fin. J. (Nov. 24, 2011),
http://legalfinancejournal.com/trends-in-ip-litigation-costs/ (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (“One of the major factors contributing to the high litigation costs is
collecting discovery.”).
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Litigation costs influence parties’ behavior.63 In addition to influencing parties’ litigiousness, i.e., their willingness to bring a claim in court,
litigation costs also affect parties’ primary behavior when the substantive
regime in question is premised on inducing behavior of a specific kind.
Tort law is a prime example, where the costs of litigation play a major
role in a regime’s ability to deter negligent behavior. One scholar therefore notes that “costly litigation implies that the tort system fails to
compel actors to exercise socially optimal precaution” and thus fails in its
deterrent function.64 When individuals know that the costs of litigation
make it unlikely that suits will be brought, the law’s ability to deter behavior begins to diminish in large measure. If litigation costs can influence a
regime’s ability to deter behavior, they must in equal measure be able to
influence a regime’s ability to incentivize behavior as well. And if copyright’s primary purpose lies in providing creators with an incentive to
create—as courts and policymakers routinely reiterate65—then rising
litigation costs will, in a similar vein, impede the system’s realization of its
core objective. The decline in litigation rates might thus suggest not just
that parties are unwilling to litigate their claims, but rather a decline in
the very utilization of the copyright system, especially given the centrality
of litigation to its functioning.
It is, of course, hard to assess the exact causes for the drop in copyright litigation rates without disaggregating the empirical evidence
further. Yet, the anecdotal evidence accompanying the Copyright
Office’s recent study seems to suggest that copyright’s litigation costs are
doing more than just deterring lawsuits. In its comment submission, the
American Society of Media Photographers, for instance, described how
these costs, and the lack of a cost-effective mechanism of redressal, were
“mak[ing] the investment necessary to become and remain a
professional photographer a staggering and constant burden,”66 in effect,

63. RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, supra note 15, at 4 (explaining how litigation costs
influence behavior).
64. Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U.
Miami L. Rev. 111, 113 (1991).
65. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an incentive to create . . . .”);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property
Law 38–39 (2003) (explaining economic incentives for creators); Justin Hughes, Fair Use
Across Time, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 775, 797 (2003) (discussing “incentive language” used by
courts and Congress when discussing copyright law); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 327 (1989)
(explaining economic incentives for creators); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A
Proposal, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 409, 428–36 (2002) (same).
66. Letter from Victor S. Perlman, Gen. Counsel & Managing Dir., Am. Soc’y of
Media Photographers, to U.S. Copyright Office (Oct. 16, 2012), available at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/comments/noi_10112012/asmp.comments.2.10.16.
12.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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then, deterring the very creative enterprise, rather than just the
commencement of lawsuits.
Copyright’s high litigation costs also discourage defendants from
contesting palpably frivolous and overbroad infringement claims by copyright owners. When offered a settlement that is much lower than what
they would have spent defending the claim—even if they know that they
are likely to succeed on the merits—rational defendants have good
reason to prefer settling to litigating.67 This only encourages copyright
owners to make overbroad claims. Some courts then unthinkingly treat
these settlements as evidence of vibrant licensing markets to constrain
the scope of the fair use defense doctrinally.68 In effect, then, defendants’
failure to litigate fair use effectively whittles away its scope and significance. The fair use doctrine is, however, more than just a “defense” in
copyright law. As copyright’s primary safety valve, it safeguards a host of
important First Amendment and free speech interests, and functions as
an incentive for downstream creativity as well.69 The functional evisceration of fair use thus has real downsides for social welfare and threatens to
undermine the very legitimacy of the copyright system.
In short then, copyright’s exorbitant litigation costs affect both
plaintiffs and defendants, distort the system’s core objectives and safety
valves, and seem to show no sign of declining. Yet, few solutions seem to
focus directly on the problem. They instead focus on reforming copyright doctrine, the lawmaking process, or the adjudicative process.70
“Litigation” and the litigation process as such are blamed for these costs
and treated as a part of the problem rather than the solution. Litigation
funding allows copyright law to directly address the problem of spiraling
litigation costs without undermining its very dependence on litigation.

67. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights,
98 Va. L. Rev. 1313, 1348 (2012) (discussing how “settlements economize on litigation
costs”).
68. See James Gibson, Accidental Rights, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 348, 351 (2007),
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/545.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(suggesting mechanism to remedy this problem); see also Gibson, Risk Aversion, supra
note 9, at 895–98 (describing this phenomenon as “market circularity”).
69. See Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of “Fair Use” in
Copyright Law, 50 Notre Dame L. Rev. 790, 794–97 (1975) (noting “copyright privilege
does not prevail against the constitutional guarantee of the first amendment” because
“unlocking of ideas requires reasonable access to materials . . . through fair use”); see also
Thomas Rogers & Andrew Szamosszegi, Fair Use in the U.S. Economy: Economic
Contribution of Industries Relying on Fair Use 17, 20–23 (2010), available at http://
www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/04/fairuseeconomy.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (detailing extensive economic contributions made by “industries
whose output is driven increasingly by activities made possible by fair use”).
70. See, e.g., Remedies for Small Copyright Claims Notice, supra note 39, at 66,760
(examining possibility of “small claims tribunal” to allow individual copyright owners to
bring infringement suits at lower cost than in federal courts); Litman, supra note 7, at 40–
52 (suggesting reform of copyright doctrine).
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B. Third Party Funding in Copyright Law
Having discussed why copyright litigation remains structurally well
suited to third party funding, this section moves to identifying the concrete advantages that copyright law, practice, and policy are likely to see
by allowing third parties to acquire and invest in infringement claims.
1. Reducing Incentive Dissipation. — Copyright’s raison d’être is
thought to lie in its ability to induce the production of creative expression.71 Despite the lack of empirical confirmation for this theory, it
continues to inform copyright lawmaking, judicial interpretation of
copyright doctrine, and scholarly writing on the subject.72 By promising
creators a set of temporally limited exclusive rights in any original work
of expression that they produce, copyright law is thought to incentivize
the creation of such expression.73 In other words, by promising creators
recourse to the state’s mechanism for disabling others from making
unauthorized copies of an original work, copyright law is thought to
motivate the production of such work. Now, if recourse to the state’s
enforcement mechanism to prevent unauthorized copying is unaffordable and rational creators know this up front, this fact will certainly interfere with copyright’s ability to act as an inducement.
Assume that the cost of making a work to Anne, an author, is $2,000,
and that she also knows that by selling copies of the work in the market
she can earn $5,000, making a net profit of $3,000. Copyright law is
thought to signal to the creator that by disabling others from copying the
work (once created), it will allow her to exploit the full market potential
(i.e., $5,000) for copies of the work, and in the process induce her to
produce the work. Now assume that a competitor appropriates (i.e.,
copies) Anne’s work, as a result of which the market for the original
shrinks to sales of $1,000, below her initial investment (i.e., her costs of
creation). At this point, for Anne to be incentivized to seek these lost
profits in an infringement action, she will need to be assured of a net
gain at the end, taking into account the costs of both creation and litigation.74 In our scenario, this means that for Anne to recover $4,000 (i.e.,
71. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 65, at 797 (“[I]t is through incentive language that
judges are most empowered to make copyright law work as it should.”); Stewart E. Sterk,
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 1197–204 (1996) (noting
two traditional justifications for copyright are that it “provides an incentive” to create and
“rewards authors”).
72. See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just
Imagine That?, 12 Theoretical Inquiries L. 29, 32–34 (2011) (questioning “basic premise
that the promise of economic reward . . . is a key factor in incentivizing people to
contribute original expression to the public”).
73. Id. at 31 (noting how incentive theory “conceives of the creative individual as a
rational profit-maximizer whose willingness to invest effort, time, and resources in creative
enterprises is directly correlated to the expected extent of the returns that will be
forthcoming”).
74. If she spends $2,000 in creating the work and $3,000 in litigating for lost profits
owing to copyright infringement, she ends up recovering $4,000 in lost profit compensa-
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the lost profits), the cost of litigation must be well below $3,000 to make
it economically viable. If this is unlikely, and she knows this prior to
creation, her rational economic incentive to create the work will
altogether disappear, since she will recognize simultaneously that (i) substitutive copying is likely to impact her profits, (ii) the costs of commencing an action against the copier to recoup these profits are very high, and
(iii) as a result, they each individually and in conjunction make the
creative activity altogether unprofitable.
The costs of copyright litigation thus influence not just the decision
whether to litigate, but in scenarios where copying is both easy and very
likely, they may also affect the decision whether to create the work at all.
The same holds true in varying degrees even when the unauthorized
copying does not cause the creator’s profits to fall below the break-even
point. The economic decision to create is thus impacted by high litigation costs; this factor is especially true for individual and one-off creators.
The inefficiency of litigation effectively dilutes and dissipates the
economic incentive that the copyright system purports to grant authors.
It might be thought that copyright’s allowance for plaintiffs to elect
for statutory damages and recover reasonable attorney’s fees75 alleviates
this problem. In reality though, these mechanisms still require copyright
owners to make significant out-of-pocket payments to sustain the litigation in the hope of obtaining these remedies, which, in addition, are “not
guaranteed.”76 It is precisely because of copyright’s rising litigation costs
and their effect on creators that the Copyright Office has recently begun
considering the possibility of alternative “small claims” dispute resolution

tion and $1,000 in terms of independent sales, barely allowing her to break even. Even at
this point, a rational creator who can predict these costs up front—which is improbable
today—is unlikely to want to create in the first place.
75. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504–505 (2012). These provisions allow a plaintiff in a copyright
infringement lawsuit to elect to receive statutory damages in lieu of actual damages at any
point during the lawsuit. Id. § 504(c)(1). When the election is made, and if the court
thereafter finds the defendant infringed, the provisions then require the court to award
the plaintiff an amount that ranges between the minimum and maximum thresholds
specified therein. Id. § 504(c)(1)–(2). Courts have generally awarded plaintiffs amounts
far in excess of any actual damage they might have suffered from the infringement. For a
discussion of this remedy and its problems, see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland,
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 439, 441 (2009) (discussing problems associated with statutory damages, e.g., they are
“frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly excessive”).
76. Remedies for Small Copyright Claims Notice, supra note 39, at 66,760. These
remedies are still to a large extent dependent on the court’s discretion. While the statutory damages provisions specify a minimum and a maximum amount, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c),
courts remain free to fix the award at any point between those two extremes. For costs and
attorney’s fees, the statute allows recovery based entirely on the court’s “discretion.” Id.
§ 505.
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mechanisms where the litigation costs are likely to be significantly
lower.77
Litigation funding, while not directly lowering the costs of copyright
litigation, nonetheless can ensure that the effect of these costs is felt most
directly by someone other than the creator. In the process, it reduces the
extent to which these costs influence the incentive to create—the institution’s primary purpose. When a creator’s work is purportedly infringed
by a copier, litigation funding would allow third parties to either acquire
the infringement claim from the creator and pursue the claim directly or
fund the claim by fronting capital to the creator, who will still bring the
action in his or her own name.78 In such an arrangement, the creator is
able to obtain upfront payment for its claim (either directly or indirectly), which, while likely to be less than the total expected value of the
claim, is nonetheless sure to be higher than what the creator might have
gotten without the involvement of the third party. This is so for two
possible reasons. One, the litigation funder is likely to have lower litigation costs, making the lawsuit potentially lucrative, with some of those
benefits passing on to the creator. Two, the litigation funder—unlike the
creator—will be able to value the lawsuit based not just on the creator’s
lost profits but on the availability of statutory damages, since this now
becomes a realistic possibility.
The litigation funder has obvious incentives to enter into such
arrangements. Remember that a litigation funder is usually an entity with
expertise in litigation. The ability to accurately value a claim and assess
the probability of a favorable outcome, the ready access to large stores of
capital, and the expertise to run the process efficiently are characteristic
features of such funders. The funder is thus well positioned to take
advantage of copyright law’s allowance for statutory damages, since the
out-of-pocket expenses needed to run the litigation are hardly a deterrent. Going back to the earlier hypothetical involving Anne the creator
reveals how this might work.
To Anne, the costs of litigating the claim for lost profits of $4,000
might be $3,000, making it economically impractical to pursue. But to a
litigation funder, XYZ Inc., these costs might be significantly lower79—say
$1,000. If XYZ now approaches Anne and offers to pay her $2,000 for the
claim (which is worth $4,000), Anne still makes a net gain of $1,000 in
the overall scheme of things, effectively preserving her incentive to
create. XYZ can expect a gain from the litigation (of $1,000) as well, even
if lost profits were the sole basis for valuing the claim. In reality though,

77. See Remedies for Small Copyright Claims Notice, supra note 39, at 66,759
(proposing this idea).
78. Part III.A.3, infra, details further how copyright law’s rules on exclusive licensing
make this a distinctively feasible possibility.
79. This is because of the economies of scale that the funder might benefit from due
to its expertise in litigation.

2013]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS

2295

even if XYZ’s costs of litigation are the same as what they were for Anne,
XYZ might value the claim much higher—say at $20,000—under copyright’s statutory damages regime.80 Since XYZ has the liquidity for large
out-of-pocket expenses, they are still likely to be far lower than its recovery, especially if attorney’s fees are also awarded, and the lawsuit now
becomes a potentially lucrative investment opportunity. Importantly, this
might even have an effect on Anne’s arrangement with XYZ. If Anne
knows that XYZ values the litigation not just on the basis of lost profits
but also using the possible recovery of statutory damages, Anne is likely
to negotiate for a much higher upfront payment for the claim. XYZ
might thus choose to pay Anne $6,000 if it knows that statutory damages
are very likely, based on its assessment of the claim. Anne thus stands to
earn a net profit of $5,000 from the overall scheme. If creators such as
Anne know that litigation funders exist to assist them with infringement
claims, the presence of these funders not only preserves the original
incentive to create, but introduces the distinct possibility of enlarging it,
by making the availability of statutory damages seem realistic.
In effect, then, litigation funding is likely to do two things simultaneously for copyright’s incentive structure. First, it will likely prevent the
complete dissipation of the incentive to create by ensuring that creators
do not have to feel compelled to litigate the claim themselves in order to
recover lost profits. Creators could rely on third parties to enforce the
claim, and thereby obtain a significant portion of these lost profits.
Second, it will form a bridge between the creator and the Copyright Act’s
provision for statutory damages. By introducing a new set of participants
into the system for whom the availability of large statutory damages after
expensive litigation is both an independent incentive and of little hardship, it raises the market value of creators’ actionable infringement
claims and allows them to internalize a significant portion of this surplus.
In the process, it allows for the possibility that copyright litigation might,
counterintuitively, now actively enhance creators’ incentives to produce.
2. Lowering Agency Costs. — A second benefit of litigation funding in
copyright is the possibility that it will lower agency costs between clients
and lawyers in monitoring and enforcing infringement. Agency costs
originate from a principal-agent problem, where an agent tasked with
protecting a principal’s interest has insufficient incentives to do so,
producing a net welfare loss.81 These costs arise from “the impossibility of
80. Copyright’s statutory damages regime contained in 17 U.S.C. § 504 allows a plaintiff to elect to receive statutory damages in lieu of actual damages, without having to establish a reason for the election. Once the election is made, and the court finds an infringement, the court is obligated to award the plaintiff no less than $750 and no more than
$30,000 per work infringed. Id. § 504(c)(1). In the event that the court finds the
infringement willful, it can increase damages to as high as $150,000 per work infringed. Id.
§ 504(c)(2).
81. For a general overview of the principal-agent problem, see Hal R. Varian,
Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach 667–88 (6th ed. 2003); Kenneth J.
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complete contracting when one party (the agent) has discretionary and
unobservable decisionmaking authority that affects the wealth of another
party (the principal).”82 It originates in situations where the principal has
no way of monitoring the implementation of an arrangement with the
agent, as a result of which the principal has little basis to know whether it
was the agent’s own conduct or external factors that produced a lessthan-desirable outcome.83
While agency costs are endemic to the attorney-client relationship in
all substantive areas, they remain exacerbated in copyright law for a
variety of interrelated reasons. As a direct consequence of its idiosyncratic subject matter (i.e., expression) that is protected automatically
upon creation and fixation,84 copyright law operates primarily through
standards rather than rules. As is well known, standards, which tend to be
imprecise and open-ended, lack the certainty of rules and entail higher
costs in their application.85 Actors, who seek to be guided by the law, are
the principal bearers of these costs, which usually manifest themselves
either in the time and effort needed to understand the law and precedents, in obtaining professional legal advice, or in needing a comprehensive process of adjudication for courts to fill the content of these
standards circumstantially ex post.86 Copyright’s standards thus exacerbate the information asymmetry between the nonspecialist creator/
copier and his or her lawyer, which is the basis of the principal-agent
problem.87 And perhaps most importantly, this is so for both plaintiffs and
defendants.
Take the plaintiff’s side first. In situations where a defendant’s copying is not literal or verbatim, a plaintiff is obligated to establish that the
defendant’s work is “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s protected
Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business 37,
37–38 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
82. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621,
636 (2004).
83. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent
Problem, 51 Econometrica 7, 10 (1983) (analyzing principal-agent problem); Stephen A.
Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 134,
134–38 (1973) (mathematically analyzing principal-agent problem).
84. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 4, § 2.03[B] (discussing copyright’s
requirement that work be fixed in tangible form in order to obtain statutory protection).
85. For an early account of the rules versus standards debate, see Ronald M. Dworkin,
The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14, 22–23 (1967) (distinguishing “rules” from
“principles, policies, and other sorts of standards”). The leading economic analysis of the
distinction is by Louis Kaplow. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 559 (1992) (analyzing “extent to which legal commands should
be promulgated as rules or standards” based on economic analysis).
86. See Kaplow, supra note 85, at 569 (discussing individual’s options when faced
with poorly defined standards).
87. See David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 139, 151
(2009) (noting inability of creators to ascertain “with clarity the scope of entitlements in
information”).
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work to establish a prima facie case of infringement.88 As is obvious from
its title, substantial similarity is hardly a straightforward question, and is,
by most accounts, copyright law’s most complex mechanism.89 Determining whether substantial similarity is met in an individual case is a probabilistic assessment that entails examining a host of precedents and expert
reports and predicting a jury’s intuitive response to the comparison. On
the defendant’s side, fair use is at once copyright law’s primary defense,
but also its most uncertain doctrine.90 Note that all of the principal-agent
problems previously discussed apply with equal force to defendants in
copyright cases as well. Determining whether a use is noninfringing
under the fair use doctrine in similar fashion requires resort to expert
legal advice in order to predict what a court is likely to do. Once again,
this structure exacerbates the information asymmetry between principal
and agent. Indeed, for copyright defendants, empirical data suggests that
avoiding any reliance on expert advice—and thereby minimizing both
litigation and agency costs—seems to be a preferred option, even when it
is overall welfare-minimizing and inefficient (i.e., when the defendant
does indeed have a valid claim of fair use).91
To see how these costs impact copyright plaintiffs and defendants,
consider the following hypothetical. Assume that Anne, the creator from
the previous hypothetical, identifies the infringement that is causing her
to lose profits, chooses to litigate the claim, and to this end retains the
law firm ABC LLP for the same. Seeing her unwillingness to pay the
firm’s exorbitant hourly charges, the firm offers to litigate the matter on
a contingency fee basis. It agrees to take one-third of any settlement or
judgment, instead of its hourly rate of $200 per hour. Early on in the
litigation, the defendant agrees to settle the matter instead of proceeding
to trial, and offers to settle the claim for $3,900. At this point, ABC has
invested no more than two billable hours of time into the matter.
For now, this Essay will leave aside any question of Anne’s ex ante
incentives to create and how the litigation costs might impact them.92 In
this scenario, ABC makes $1,300 from the settlement, and having spent
two billable hours (worth $400 in all), its net gain is $900. Anne takes
$2,600 from the settlement. On the face of things, this outcome seems
fine for all parties involved: Anne stands in a positive position, the firm
88. Id. at 157–60.
89. For a fuller discussion of substantial similarity in copyright law, see Balganesh,
Normativity of Copying, supra note 58, at 206 (detailing complexity of substantial similarity and finding rationale for such complexity).
90. See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per
curiam) (describing fair use doctrine as copyright’s “most troublesome” doctrine).
91. See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 87, at 153 (noting “trend toward clearing all
possible rights due to extreme risk-aversion”); Gibson, Risk Aversion, supra note 9, at 887
(discussing how certain factors “cause copyright users to seek licenses even when they have
a good fair use claim”).
92. For a discussion of this, see supra Part II.B.1.
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makes a net gain, and neither plaintiff nor defendant wastes large
expenses in protracted copyright litigation. Assume, however, that an
extra hour’s worth of research (say, into the jurisprudence of substantial
similarity in order to allege that the defendant’s copying might have
allowed the court to decide the matter on summary judgment) would
have forced the defendant to raise its settlement offer by another $600,
to $4,500. Assuming that ABC knows this to be likely, in deciding
whether to spend the extra time doing this research, ABC has no incentive
to do so. For even though it will raise the award by $400 for Anne
(making her payout $3,000), the extra effort produces no net gain for
the law firm. The extra hour is worth $200 to it, which is also exactly what
it will likely make from the increased settlement. The agent’s (i.e.,
ABC’s) failure to make this extra effort now causes the principal (Anne)
a loss of $400, which is a welfare loss. Anne has no way of knowing this,
since her ability to monitor ABC’s actions is very limited. This welfare loss
is entirely a result of the principal-agent problem.
Even if Anne had opted for hourly billing, the problem would nonetheless have manifested itself, albeit in a different form. In the initial
settlement offer, Anne would have made $3,500, and the firm $400.
Here, however, ABC has every reason to continue negotiating with the
defendant for every minor increment in the settlement. Thus if it takes
ABC an additional ten hours to raise the settlement by an added $750, it
might choose to do so to make an additional $2,000, and raise Anne’s
settlement to $4,650. Again Anne has no way of knowing this or
monitoring ABC’s incremental actions. All the same, Anne is paying
$2,000 for the added $750, producing a welfare loss of $1,250, caused
once again by the principal-agent problem.
The welfare loss that these situations produce together with the costs
it would take for a principal to effectively monitor the agent’s actions to
ensure compliance constitute the “agency costs” produced.93 The
principal-agent problem and the accompanying agency costs and welfare
losses that it produces are the result of a misalignment of parties’ interests, which produces contradictory incentives. An obvious solution is thus
one that aligns parties’ interests, or at least minimizes the possibility that
they point in opposite directions.94 In the copyright context, the extensive information asymmetry between lawyers and clients exacerbates the
problem of misaligned incentives. This is where the involvement of third
parties will help.
Litigation funding arrangements allow for control—complete or
substantial—over the copyright litigation process to be vested in the
93. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308 (1976) (defining agency costs as sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss).
94. See generally Sitkoff, supra note 82, at 637–38 (summarizing some of these
solutions in other areas of law).
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entity or individual actually bearing its full costs. Litigation funders are
usually entities with significant legal expertise of their own, which allows
them to avoid relying entirely on outside representation to value, litigate,
and settle the copyright claims that they acquire.95 The process of claim
acquisition enables funders to obtain the claim from plaintiffs and
litigate it on their own. This, in turn, consolidates ownership and control
over the process in a single entity. Even when the funding is short of an
outright acquisition—for instance, partial funding or an investment—it
still ordinarily delegates a good deal of control over the process to the
third party funder, specifically to ensure that the funding is used
effectively and to reduce the moral hazard previously identified.96 In
short, the principal-agent problem is pervasive in copyright litigation and
produces a host of social welfare losses, which could be significantly
minimized by a market for infringement claims.
3. Lowering the Costs of Defendant Risk Aversion. — Defendant risk
aversion remains a major problem in copyright law. In addition to generating a host of socially inefficient practices, it also routinely distorts
interpretations of the fair use doctrine.97 Solutions to the problem have
almost always focused on changes to copyright doctrine or institutions in
order to introduce more bright line rules into the system, in the belief
that this would introduce greater certainty for litigants threatened with
lawsuits.98 The fair use doctrine, the device around which much of this
risk aversion manifests itself, is thus thought to be in need of serious
reform. And yet, there is little reason to believe that courts or Congress
will do anything at all to amend the current version of the doctrine.99
Here again, litigation funding can ameliorate the situation—at least
partially.
Litigation funding is ordinarily thought to operate exclusively on the
plaintiff’s side. This need not be the case. In several common law juris-

95. See Lyon, supra note 1, at 593, 602, 608 (detailing expertise of litigation
funders).
96. See, e.g., Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 33, at 503–15 (analyzing control mechanism in place for complex litigation financing arrangement involving
investment rather than outright acquisition).
97. See Gibson, Risk Aversion, supra note 9, at 898–99. Gibson describes the process
of “doctrinal feedback,” wherein risk-averse defendants obtain licenses from copyright
owners even when their use would qualify as a fair use, in order to avoid the possibility of
losing after an expensive trial. Gibson explains that courts sometimes construe this
practice as representing a vibrant and legitimate licensing market for the work and, as a
result, shrink the fair use doctrine to no longer cover such uses.
98. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1087, 1143 (2007)
(suggesting creation of “Fair Use Board” to, among other things, promote greater clarity
in copyright law); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va. L.
Rev. 1483, 1488 (2007) (advocating use of bright line safe harbors in fair use law to add
certainty).
99. See Litman, supra note 7, at 41 (articulating series of reforms but noting they are
very unlikely to be enacted into law).
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dictions, a market has begun to emerge for what is known as “after the
event” insurance.100 In these situations, a third party insurer enters the
picture and offers to insure a party—the defendant—after litigation has
commenced.101 The premium for these policies is usually based on the
unique nature of the claim and the possibility of a successful defense.
The insurer of these policies, importantly, does not offer to insure
against the actual outcome or verdict, but rather against the expenses
that the defendant needs to incur to defend the claim in court.102 This
includes attorney’s fees, litigation costs, discovery costs, and the like.
Indeed, in jurisdictions where the market for such policies is fairly robust
on both the plaintiff and defendant sides, courts today allow claims for
fee-shifting (i.e., to recover any attorney’s fees) to include the premiums
that a party has paid for any “after the event” insurance.103
This model could expand to include instances where the defendant
insures not just the expenses of litigation, but also the underlying settlement/award as well. In this scenario, the defendant would purchase
insurance from a third party that covers the expenses of litigation and a
likely settlement/award figure, which is based not on what the plaintiff
seeks in its claim or settlement offer, but rather on what the third party
insurer objectively values the suit at. This valuation judgment would be
based on the insurer’s own independent assessment of its ability to
defend the claim or force the plaintiff to a lower settlement. In recent
work, Jonathan Molot has made the tentative case for such a modification of the insurance model into what he calls the “market in litigation
risk.”104 He notes, however, that for this model to work, among other
things, insurers would need to develop a way of valuing the litigation risk
being acquired, which is highly problematic given how individualized it is
likely to be.105 The heterogeneity of the risk is thought to impede insur100. For a recent overview of this phenomenon, see Collin M. Davison, Note, Fee
Shifting and After-the-Event Insurance: A Twist to a Thirteenth Century Approach to
Shifting Attorneys’ Fees to Solve a Twenty-First Century Problem, 59 Drake L. Rev. 1199,
1202–04 (2011).
101. See id. at 1203 (“After-the-event insurance must be thought of not as insuring
against the triggering, litigable event that has already occurred, but against the risk of
litigation or an adverse judgment after the suit is filed.”).
102. See, e.g., ATE Insurance Explained, TheJudge, http://www.thejudge.co.uk/ateinsurance/ate-insurance-explained (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct.
25, 2013) (“After the Event Insurance . . . provides an indemnity for legal costs in the
event that a client loses a piece of litigation or arbitration.”).
103. See, e.g., U.K. CPR 44.3A–B (2010) (providing rules for assessing costs,
including rules governing provision of costs for third party insurance).
104. Molot, Market in Litigation Risk, supra note 34, at 375–78 (proposing “to
develop a risk-transfer and risk-pooling mechanism that could reduce the secondary and
tertiary costs of litigation”).
105. Id. at 383. Molot observes the following:
For an insurance actuary, the unique characteristics of individual lawsuits
make litigation risk seem almost uninsurable. Insurance actuaries are trained to
price risks for large groups of similarly situated policyholders. Indeed, actuaries
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ers’ ability to pool it together.106 Molot, however, assumes the third party
insurer’s portfolio of litigation risks to be sufficiently diversified—either
in actuality or as a goal. In other words, the problems of individualized
risk are enhanced by the diverse areas at which the insurer is looking.
With a diversified portfolio, the insurer would have to make an individualized assessment of each litigation being insured and would remain
unable to pool them together to trade off the risks. If the insurer were to
instead focus on one specialized area, and rely on the valuations and
assessments of its lawyers (rather than actuaries) as Molot suggests,107 a
large part of this problem is likely to disappear. The insurer would now
be able to aggregate the claims into a common pool and calculate the
risks and benefits in the aggregate rather than individually. In this way, a
fair use insurance market might begin to emerge in copyright litigation.
Aiding in the development of this market is the legal jurisprudence
of the fair use doctrine. While its results may seem uncertain to the layperson, this doctrine is far from completely unpredictable. With the vast
amount of fair use jurisprudence that has developed over the years,
coupled with the fact that it is normally a question for the court and not
the jury, lawyers are today in a position to make a decent probabilistic
assessment of whether a fair use defense remains viable in any particular
case. In an extensive new empirical study, Matthew Sag reviews all fair use
decisions handed down by federal courts to see if the doctrine is predictably applied and whether some coherence can be seen in cases decided
using the doctrine.108 Sag concludes that contrary to common perception, fair use decisions are indeed predictable along multiple dimensions.109 He goes on to note that in practice, the doctrine is hardly as
incoherent as some believe it to be.110 Over time and context, there exists
today a vast amount of fair use jurisprudence that actuaries—working
with lawyers, as Molot suggests—should be able to synthesize into probabilistic assessments of the defense succeeding in any particular case. With
time, this pool is only likely to expand, allowing the market for fair use
insurance to expand and become relatively stable.
Third party litigation funders might thus, with the right set of
procedural changes, begin to offer a tailored insurance product to
calculate insurance premiums by fitting each policyholder into a large,
homogenous group and examining the historical performance of the group as a
whole. The fewer distinguishing features, the better, as this enables actuaries to
use broad statistical evidence to price policyholder risks. The fact that a lawsuit is
unique places it largely beyond actuarial science.
Id.
106. Id. at 381–85.
107. Id. at 384.
108. Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 47 (2012).
109. Id. at 84–85.
110. Id. at 85 (noting study “offers considerable evidence against the oft-repeated
assertion that fair use adjudication is blighted by unpredictability and doctrinal
incoherence”).
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defendants in copyright infringement claims—known as “fair use
insurance.” The insurer would thus assess the likelihood of a defendant
successfully raising the fair use defense in a copyright claim and offer to
acquire the litigation risk from the defendant in return for a premium. If
the premium is tied directly to the likely payout that the insurer will have
to make, it may be lower than a settlement offer made by the plaintiff,
especially when the fair use defense is strong. Copyright law already
contains a provision allowing for attorney fee-shifting, which applies to
defendants as well as plaintiffs.111 If courts begin interpreting it purposively and follow the approach of U.K. courts in allowing litigation insurance premiums to be recovered as well,112 it is likely defendants will transfer their litigation risk to an insurer. The insurer would then take over
the defense from the litigant (as a subrogation) instead of defendants
caving in and settling for the amount demanded by the plaintiff. The
insurer might hope that its entry and expertise will force the plaintiff to
offer a low settlement, or withdraw the claim altogether where it is
without merit. Consider the following hypothetical.
ABC Studios commences an action against Joe for using a tensecond clip of its new blockbuster movie in a documentary film that Joe
makes for his college project. ABC sends him a cease and desist letter
(which he ignores), then threatens him with damages of $150,000 for
willful infringement. ABC also offers to settle the matter if he admits
liability and pays $12,000 for a license. Joe knows that his use is very likely
(if not certainly) a fair use of the work, but recognizes that even if he
were to litigate the claim, it would cost him $20,000 in attorney’s fees to
do so. Even though current law allows courts to award successful defendants their “reasonable” attorney’s fees,113 to Joe the risk of this award not
covering his fees and the need for immediate liquidity to cover the outof-pocket expenses that this entails makes him more willing to accede to
ABC’s demands and settle. This in many ways represents precisely what
happens today. If litigation funding were to develop in copyright law, a
litigation funder, called, say, LF Inc., would provide copyright defendants
with an insurance product once the plaintiff files a claim. LF Inc. would
be an entity with significant expertise in copyright matters with the
capital to take on the risks to which Joe is averse. To make it viable for
Joe, LF would have to offer Joe a premium lower than the projected
settlement offer from ABC. Suppose LF offers Joe insurance for $6,000.
LF knows—from its assessment of past fair use cases—that (a) ABC’s
claim is without merit, (b) litigation is likely to result in an award of
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (allowing courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees
to prevailing party); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 525–27 (1994) (concluding
§ 505 applies to defendants and observing “defendants who seek to advance a variety of
meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent
that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement”).
112. U.K. CPR 44.3A–B (2010).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 505.
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attorney’s fees, and (c) LF has the ability and expertise to deal with the
matter at a cost much lower than Joe’s. In acquiring the defense claim
from Joe, LF also hopes that ABC will come to recognize that the
bargaining asymmetry that previously existed has now been eliminated,
making it more willing to withdraw its claim altogether, or at worst to
settle for a significantly lower amount (say, $1,000)—rendering its own
investment profitable.
As an insurer with the ability to spread its risk across a wide range of
parties, LF is likely to be far less risk-averse than Joe, an individual
litigant. LF also has the resources and expertise at its disposal to lower its
risk. This, in turn, allows it to fund defendants with otherwise high-risk
claims. While such funding certainly does not eliminate defendant risk
aversion in its entirety, and in some ways is parasitic on it, it has the
direct effect of reducing the socially wasteful costs associated with such
risk aversion—both to the defendant and the copyright system as a
whole. In the aggregate, the funder’s risk taking neutralizes some of the
effects of the defendant’s risk aversion.
A more direct solution to the problem might seem to lie in reducing
defendants’ overall litigation costs, thereby curtailing their risk aversion
and its negative effects at the source. As a practical matter though, this is
highly unlikely. First, extremely high litigation costs are hardly unique to
copyright litigation. Most forms of commercial litigation face the same
problem, and given that copyright disputes are litigated in general
(rather than specialized) federal courts, copyright litigants must endure
the realities of the overall system. What makes litigation problematic for
copyright, however, is how heavily dependent the entitlement and its
functioning are on such litigation. Thus, any lowering of costs will need
to happen on a system-wide basis. Second, plaintiff-side lawyers—and the
legal profession more generally—have little to gain from such a reduction, since most of these litigation costs consist of attorney’s fees. Both of
these factors render it highly unlikely that lowering litigation costs
remains a viable solution. The entry of defendant funders, however,
ensures that the full impact of these costs is not felt solely by defendants,
which in turn distorts copyright doctrine.
To be sure, the entry of defense funders will not eliminate the
socially wasteful effects of defendant risk aversion altogether. In the
hypothetical above, Joe still is forced to buy insurance (and transfer the
defense to LF) when he should not have to do so at all as a matter of law,
owing to the fair use doctrine. All that LF’s entry achieves is a reduction,
albeit a significant one, in the wasted expense. At the same time though,
as more and more defense funders begin to enter copyright litigation
and the market becomes more robust, it is likely that a huge reduction in
the number of frivolous lawsuits—lawsuits where a defendant has a
complete defense and the plaintiff is merely seeking to take advantage of
a defendant’s risk aversion—will occur. Just as funding on the claim (i.e.,
plaintiff’s) side forms a bridge between the creator and the regime of
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statutory damages, funding on the defense side is likely to form an
analogous bridge between a defendant with a strong defense and copyright’s fee-shifting provision, if sufficiently strengthened.114
4. Valuing and Sorting Claims. — In addition to performing an allocative function, markets in numerous contexts also serve the important
purpose of enabling a price-based “commensuration.”115 Commensuration refers to the process of transforming “different qualities into a
common metric.”116 A market for copyright claims would thus, in addition to allowing the claim to vest in an entity best positioned to enforce
it, also result in a process wherein those very entities come to value the
claim based on its probability of succeeding. With their purchase of or
investment in the claim becoming public, this would signal to the parties
involved, and indeed to the court, the strength of the claim in question.
This is especially likely to be true in situations where the third party’s
involvement is an acquisition of the claim outright, i.e., a claim transfer.117 At the time the action commences, or during discovery thereafter,
a third party’s acquisition of the claim and the price of such acquisition
are likely to become public. This will send an important signal—both to
the other side, and potentially to courts as well. To the other side, it will
114. It is worth noting that the model being suggested here—in terms of fair use
insurance—is quite different from forms of “media liability insurance” and “errors and
omissions insurance” that are routinely available to creators and movie producers. See,
e.g., James T. Borelli, Caveat Emptor: A Buyer’s Guide to Media Liability Insurance,
Comm. Law., Winter 2006, at 23, 23–24, 28 (providing concise overview of media liability
insurance); see also Melvin Simensky & Eric C. Osterberg, The Insurance and
Management of Intellectual Property Risks, 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 321, 325–29
(1999) (discussing such insurance). Whereas the idea of fair use insurance proposed here
involves the purchase of insurance after the potential liability-triggering event, i.e., the
litigation, has arisen, those other forms of insurance are usually put in place before the
triggering event. Additionally, studies seem to suggest that the extensive use of “before the
event” insurance has exacerbated defendant risk aversion in the copyright licensing
market. See Gibson, Risk Aversion, supra note 9, at 893–94 (describing how such liability
insurance facilitates defendant risk aversion). But see Thomas Plotkin & Tarae Howell,
“Fair is Foul and Foul is Fair:” Have Insurers Loosened the Chokepoint of Copyright and
Permitted Fair Use’s Breathing Space in Documentary Films?, 15 Conn. Ins. L.J. 407, 470–
85 (2009) (arguing insurers have embraced fair use, despite its uncertainty, since 2007).
The use of “after the event” fair use insurance is, on the other hand, directed at reducing
such risk aversion.
115. See Daniel Markovits, Market Solidarity 1: Price as Commensuration, Contract
as Integration 22 (Oct. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“One of the signal achievements of markets is that . . . [they] serve, quite literally,
as the means of market-commensuration.”).
116. Wendy Nelson Espeland & Mitchell L. Stevens, Commensuration as a Social
Process, 24 Ann. Rev. Soc. 313, 314 (1998).
117. Every plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit bears the burden of establishing
ownership of a valid copyright. See 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 4, § 13.01[A]
(discussing plaintiff and defendant burdens in copyright disputes). In situations where a
third party acquires the claim from a creator-plaintiff, it too will have to present evidence
of this ownership; the details of its acquisition will have to be entered into the court
record.
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signal the possibility that the claim has some merit, evidenced by the third
party’s willingness to assume some of the risk that it entails. Meritless or
frivolous claims are unlikely to attract such investment or acquisition. To
a court, similarly, the third party’s involvement might signal the absence
of a frivolous or meritless claim. Yet, as a functional matter, the absence of
such an acquisition in a robust market is likely to be more important to
the system than what an actual acquisition or investment signals.118
In due course, when infringement claims of a certain kind are
routinely financed by third parties, a litigant’s inability to secure such
third party involvement might signal that the claim has a low probability
of success, or indeed that it is meritless. This is in turn likely to make a
defendant more willing to contest the claim, rather than settle early. In
addition, this considered noninvolvement by third parties is also likely to
deter plaintiffs themselves from bringing such claims. In other words, a
third party’s refusal to fund or acquire an infringement claim for reasons
having to do with the strength of the claim might in reality work to deter
the very entry of such claims into the litigation system.119
The idea of third party involvement in the funding and acquisition
of legal claims has faced a good deal of objection from those who believe
that it is likely to raise the overall volume of litigation in courts and
encourage parties to bring lawsuits they otherwise might not have
brought.120 Some have even suggested that it is likely to result in more
frivolous lawsuits being brought.121 Yet it is more likely that just the opposite will occur. When a potential plaintiff receives information from a
third party to the effect that the claim is very weak and unworthy of outside investment, the plaintiff is likely to abandon it altogether. Litigation,
scholars often forget, involves large emotional, dignitary, and reputational costs, besides the obvious first-order costs of its own.122 Max
Schanzenbach and David Dana point this out in advocating for the
greater involvement of third parties in tort litigation. They note that “the
flip side to . . . communicating the high value of strong, low-risk claims, is
118. For an insightful recent account of the problems involved in pricing legal claims
during a third party’s involvement and a solution to them, see Maya Steinitz, How Much Is
That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal Claims, 67 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2310244 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(suggesting process of “staged funding” as solution to uncertainty problems involved in
pricing legal claims).
119. See David Dana & Max Schanzenbach, How Would Third Party Financing
Change the Face of American Tort Litigation? The Role of Agency Costs in the AttorneyClient Relationship 2 (Sept. 14, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“In addition, third party financing may convey information to the
client about the expected recovery. In this case, low-value litigation, beneficial to the
attorney but not the client, may be deterred.”).
120. See U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, supra note 19, at 5–6 (arguing against
third party litigation financing).
121. Id.
122. Dana & Schanzenbach, supra note 119, at 9.
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that it will also communicate the low value of nuisance claims [and]
[a]ssuming a distaste for litigation among most people, a strong ex ante
signal of claim value may act as a deterrent to low-value claims.”123 When
the probability of success is objectively calibrated—using third parties—
even an otherwise risk-prone or overoptimistic plaintiff is likely to exhibit
a reduced willingness to bring and continue the claim in court.
In short, then, the entry of third parties into copyright litigation is
likely to introduce a valuable sorting mechanism into the system. Key
beneficiaries of this sorting are likely to be potential defendants, courts,
and, on occasion, plaintiffs themselves.124
III. STRUCTURING A MARKET FOR COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
This Essay has discussed how the involvement of third parties in
copyright litigation—through a market for actionable copyright claims—
might serve to benefit both plaintiffs and defendants, and in the process
reduce the various social costs traditionally associated with protracted
litigation. This Part describes how such a market might take shape and
some of the necessary doctrinal changes that will need to be put in place
to encourage and regulate the development of this market.
Part III.A describes five possible market arrangements wherein third
parties play a role in copyright litigation. Part III.B then looks at some of
the current doctrinal hurdles that serve as impediments to such
arrangements.
A. Possible Forms of Third Party Involvement in Copyright Litigation
As noted earlier, the “market for copyright claims” need not always
involve an outright purchase of the actionable claim by a third party.125
All that it entails, as used here, is the process by which a third party
acquires some degree of control over the copyright litigation by funding
a primary litigating party and through which the third party hopes to
obtain a net benefit when the litigation ends. Arrangements short of outright sales are thus equally effective market mechanisms.

123. Id. at 10.
124. For this benefit to be realized, however, it is crucial that rules emerge mandating
plaintiffs disclose any financial involvement of a third party (or indeed its own status as a
third party) during the litigation. Without such a rule, third parties are unlikely to find the
incentive to disclose their involvement and will likely go to extreme lengths to conceal it,
effectively ensuring that any valuation and sorting benefits are not realized. See, e.g.,
Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, CNNMoney (June 28, 2011, 2:06
PM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/28/have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-law
suit-2/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing one third party funder’s tactics
in trying to keep its involvement confidential).
125. See text accompanying notes 28–35 (outlining three forms of third party
involvement in litigation).
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1. Assignments of the Right to Sue for Infringement. — The most obvious
market mechanism involving actionable copyright claims is allowing the
third party to acquire the claim as an asset from the plaintiff in return for
valuable consideration.126 It is important to understand that in this
arrangement, the third party obtains no interest whatsoever in the actual
copyrighted work itself, meaning it obtains no interest in the exclusive
rights obtained by the original copyright holder under the copyright
system. The third party merely obtains the right to commence an action
for copyright infringement either generally or against defendants specified in the arrangement. The assignment can be prospective, i.e., for yetto-occur infringements, or retroactive, i.e., for already-accrued instances
of infringement.127
In ordinary assignments of actionable claims, the original litigant
drops out of the picture altogether and the assignee thereafter
commences (or continues) the litigation in its own name against the
defendant.128 For this process to work, it is essential that the law allow a
third party assignee to bring the action in its own name without imposing
onerous standing requirements on the third party, which render the
acquisition meaningless. Courts today are divided on whether copyright
law allows third parties to bring infringement actions when they acquire
the bare right to sue—a factor that is likely to inhibit the early development of this arrangement.129
Assignments provide obvious advantages over most other forms of
arrangements for third parties. They give the third party complete
control and autonomy over the litigation and settlement processes, since
the original plaintiff drops out of the picture. They also allow the third
party to itself alienate (or reassign) the claim to another third party
should it need to, without any restrictions at all. Assignments are also the
most beneficial arrangement from an information sharing perspective.
With the court and the public easily obtaining information about the

126. See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29
Harv. L. Rev. 816 (1916) (surveying common law’s historical treatment of assigning choses
in action); Percy H. Winfield, Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance
and Champerty, 35 L.Q.R. 143 (1919) (same).
127. For a useful overview of copyright law’s treatment of retroactive transfers, see
James K. Rothstein, Comment, Unilateral Settlements and Retroactive Transfers: A
Problem of Copyright Co-Ownership, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 881, 890–902 (2009).
128. The law treats the assignee as the “real party in interest.” See Charles E. Clark &
Robert M. Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 Yale L.J. 259, 261–62 (1925) (“[T]he
real party in interest is he who by substantive law has the right of action.”).
129. Compare Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (finding such assignments to be impermissible), with Prather v. Neva
Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1969) (permitting such assignment). For a
fuller discussion of the obstacles current copyright law presents to the creation of a market
for copyright claims, see infra Part III.B.2.
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third party’s direct involvement in the claim, the sorting and classification advantages discussed earlier are much more likely to be realized.130
2. Nonrecourse Financing of Infringement Lawsuits. — Instead of acquiring the lawsuit as an actionable claim from the original plaintiff, third
parties might instead choose to invest in the copyright infringement lawsuit through a financing arrangement. In other forms of litigation, such
financing is normally done through a nonrecourse loan, under which the
plaintiff accepts no personal liability for repayment, and satisfaction of
the debt (i.e., the loan) occurs exclusively through the proceeds from the
litigation—either the judgment award or the settlement.131 Unlike in an
assignment, the original plaintiff continues to remain a part of the litigation since the lawsuit continues in its name.132 The third party funder
would nonetheless exert a good degree of control over the litigation process and strategy through a contractual arrangement with the plaintiff.
Arrangements of this kind leave the third party funder with less
control and autonomy over the lawsuit than in an assignment,133 and are
likely to be seen in situations where the plaintiff (and its team) has significant expertise in copyright litigation, which the third party funder trusts
and upon which it is willing to rely. In addition to needing an independent contract on the question of control, these arrangements also serve
the information disclosure function to a far lesser degree, since the role
of the third party is never made public—and is only ever learned of
during discovery.134 As a result, the possibility of any ex ante sorting and
signaling is diminished quite significantly (or eliminated). Lastly, these
arrangements also leave the third party with fewer exit options. Whereas
in an assignment the third party can readily alienate the claim to another
party or choose to terminate the litigation, in financing arrangements
the third party has little ability to stop the lawsuit and would need to find
another investor to acquire the loan made to the plaintiff.
Nonrecourse financing of this kind is likely to be seen in copyright
infringement lawsuits between two large commercial competitors, not in
130. See supra Part II.B.4 (suggesting entry of third parties into copyright litigation
likely provides valuable sorting mechanism for copyright claims).
131. Nonrecourse funding more generally is defined as involving “[a] secured loan
that allows the lender to attach only the collateral, not the borrower’s personal assets, if
the loan is not repaid.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1020 (9th ed. 2009).
132. See Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to
Third-Party Litigation Funding, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 343, 356 (2011) (“[T]he
central issue around . . . the distinction between the practice of selling claims and [third
party litigation funding] . . . is control over the litigation.”).
133. See id. (describing third party litigation funding as when “claimant receives
from the funder coverage of all litigation costs, in exchange for a share of the award, but
maintains full control over the litigation”).
134. In the copyright context, the Righthaven episode remains a prime example. See
Balganesh, Uneasy Case, supra note 6, at 738–46 (examining strategy and business model
of Righthaven, “perhaps the first entity to capitalize on copyright law’s lax rules on
standing, assignment, and damages”).
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individual lawsuits where an assignment is likely to be preferred by both
the original plaintiff and the third party.135
3. Tailored Exclusive Licenses. — A third way that third parties might
choose to be involved in the infringement action is unique to copyright
law. It seeks to work around the ambiguity surrounding the permissibility
of open assignments to sue by using the law’s standing requirements.
The copyright statute treats an “exclusive license” as a transfer of copyright ownership for the purposes of the statute,136 and additionally allows
copyright’s bundle of exclusive rights to be disaggregated and broken
down into idiosyncratic and narrow subrights in whatever way parties
choose.137 Thus, not only can the exclusive right to distribute the work be
licensed independently of other rights, but that right itself can be broken
down further (e.g., the exclusive right to distribute the work in Santa
Clara County, San Jose City, or California) and licensed or assigned
independently.138 This disaggregation is significant because the law then
confers on the legal or beneficial owner of an “exclusive right” the power
to commence an action for infringement of that right.139 Therefore, in
order to effect a de facto assignment of the right to sue for copyright
infringement to a third party, the original copyright holder has to grant
the third party an exclusive license that is artificially tailored to the
market or context in which the infringement is occurring. This confers
standing on the third party to bring the action in its own name, and the
artificial tailoring of the license ensures that the original copyright owner
(i.e., the licensor) has no reason to worry about the third party exploiting the work or doing anything other than bringing the infringement
action. This is best illustrated through an example.
Assume that Jonathan is a first-time novelist based in New York City
who self-publishes his book The Seasons in hardback on October 1, 2010,
and begins marketing it shortly thereafter. He retains all the rights to his
work. On January 1, 2011, Jonathan learns that a publisher located in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, has begun making paperback copies of The
Seasons and distributing them without his permission. Jonathan wants to
bring an action against the publisher; TF Inc., a litigation funder,
approaches him on June 1, 2011. Instead of granting TF an assignment
of the bare right to sue—which would be of questionable validity—
Jonathan grants TF an exclusive license to reproduce The Seasons in
paperback book form in Cambridge, Massachusetts, from January 1 to
June 1, 2011. This arrangement confers on TF the power to commence
the lawsuit for copyright infringement on its own, since it is the legal

135. For an example of a prominent copyright case involving two large companies,
see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “transfer of copyright ownership”).
137. Id. § 201(d)(2).
138. Id. § 201(d)(1).
139. Id. § 501(b).
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owner of the right in question, even though the right has been chopped
up along the dimensions of time (six months), geography (Cambridge),
and form (paperback). Even though TF obtains an exclusive license, the
retroactive and limited nature of the grant renders it highly unlikely, if
not impossible, that TF will actually exploit the work by reproducing it.
The exclusive license thus operates exactly like an assignment.
The obvious downside to using tailored exclusive licenses instead of
actual assignments of the actionable claim is that it requires identifying
specific defendants by region or market, before the license is executed—
i.e., tailoring. An assignment of the bare right to sue, on the other hand,
does not require such identification and can transfer the power to bring
infringement suits against whole classes of defendants, which an exclusive license cannot. The exclusive license route is thus likely to be used
only until courts (and perhaps Congress) come to accept the legality of
assignments of the right to sue for copyright infringement.140
4. Assignments of the Copyright in Its Entirety. — The most obvious way
for a third party to be involved in a copyright infringement action is by
acquiring the copyright in the infringed work in its entirety. Once the
assignment has been properly executed,141 the third party becomes the
new owner of the copyrighted work, with the power to commence an
infringement action.142 Much like the assignment of the actionable claim,
the original owner exits the picture altogether, giving the third party
complete control over the process. However, unlike in the assignment of
just the claim, the original owner retains no rights whatsoever to
continue exploiting or using the work, since the third party becomes the
owner for all purposes. Consequently, assignments of a work in its
entirety merely in order to allow a third party to bring suit are likely to be
somewhat rare, since they confer more authority than is necessary for the
commencement of the lawsuit. Thus, they only occur in situations where
either the original copyright holder obtains a large enough payout from
the third party, rendering it willing to avoid dealing in the work
altogether, or where the third party is willing to acquire the copyright for
the potential to commence lawsuits against future defendants as well.
Third parties that acquire the copyright with the sole objective of
litigating infringement claims or licensing its use to others resemble
nonpracticing entities or “patent trolls” in the area of patent law.143 The
probabilistic and prospect-like nature of the patent right encourages this

140. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing obstacles to realizing copyright claims market).
141. See 17 U.S.C. § 204 (prescribing proper execution of copyright transfer).
142. Id. § 201(d).
143. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1571, 1577–82 (2009)
(defining nonpracticing entities as “corporate patent enforcement entit[ies] that neither
practice[] nor seek[] to commercialize [their] inventions”).
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model in relation to patents.144 Copyright’s entitlement, on the other
hand, which is tied to the specific expression in question, allows for such
prospecting to a much lesser extent, which is likely to result in this
approach to third party involvement being somewhat rare.145
5. Fair Use Insurance. — The previous discussion describes mechanisms through which third parties may come to be involved in copyright
infringement litigation on the plaintiff’s side. Yet, as discussed earlier,
third party litigation funding can benefit defendants as well.146 The
principal way in which this is likely to come about is through a mechanism best described as fair use insurance—where the third party underwrites the defendant’s likelihood of success in its fair use defense.
Importantly, the defendant obtains such insurance after the litigation has
commenced and fair use is raised as a defense, thereby rendering fair use
insurance, as described here, a form of “after the event” insurance.147
Situations could thus arise where a defendant being sued for copyright infringement raises a colorable defense of fair use. If a sufficiently
robust fee-shifting regime were put in place, the beginnings of which are
already contained in current law,148 third parties would likely be willing
to underwrite the defense by pricing the risk associated with its success
(and factoring in their own expertise in litigating the claim), and then
potentially would bring the defense themselves. If the premium offered
by the third party for such underwriting is significantly lower than the
144. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 48, at 95 (arguing patent rights are not welldefined property rights but are probabilistic because they embody good deal of uncertainty as to commercial value, legal validity, and scope). The original idea for this conception of the patent goes back to Ed Kitch’s seminal work. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265, 266 (1977) (analogizing patent
rights to mineral prospecting claims).
145. For the argument that copyright law does not embody an architecture similar to
patent law, see Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright, supra note 11, at 1621–24.
146. See Molot, Market in Litigation Risk, supra note 34, at 374 (“Even if we did
nothing to reduce the time and money spent on the litigation process, we could ease the
burdens on corporate defendants by spreading litigation risk over a larger pool of risk
bearers.”); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing how litigation funding can lower costs of defendant risk aversion).
147. It is also important to note that, technically speaking, after the event insurance
is fundamentally different from traditional litigation funding in that it is not an actual
investment by a third party, even though it involves passing on risk to the third party for
consideration. Additionally, as an insurance product, it is likely to be regulated by the
ordinary rules and norms governing the insurance industry. See Michelle Boardman,
Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of Litigation Participation, 8 J.L.
Econ. & Pol’y 673, 673 (2012) (discussing differences between insurance and litigation
funding and their implications). Yet, because it is routinely discussed as a form of defendant-side litigation funding (or third party involvement), it is worth considering in the
context of copyright claims as well. See id. at 690–91 (noting prevalence of this comparison and criticizing “not its inaccuracy but its superficiality”).
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (allowing “reasonable attorney’s fee” to be awarded
to prevailing party); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) (holding successful
defendants were entitled to invoke § 505).
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settlement offer from the plaintiff (which is in turn likely to be lower
than the amount demanded at trial), defendants—especially those whose
existence depends on their continued reliance on the fair use
doctrine149—are likely to obtain such insurance. In due course, variations
in the coverage offered by third parties are likely to occur, correlating to
the amount of control third parties assume over the litigation and
settlement processes. Here, a variety of arrangements might materialize,
which may track some of the options just discussed on the plaintiff’s side.
The third party may simply fund the defendant’s case, or instead might
choose to take the lead in defending the claim and deciding on litigation
strategy. What distinguishes these policies from traditional liability insurance is the fact that they are obtained by defendants after the litigation
(or the threat of litigation) actually materializes, and not necessarily in
advance.
B. Obstacles
In order to develop a copyright claims market, participants in the
copyright system must view litigation as an integral part of the system and
its functioning. In addition to this attitudinal shift, developing the
market will require overcoming a host of legal obstacles rooted in the
common law and in the statutory language and judicial interpretation of
the Copyright Act. This section explores the primary legal obstacles that
a market for copyright claims is likely to face and suggests possible
remedial fixes. This section discusses two somewhat independent sets of
obstacles: (i) those originating in the common law and (ii) those internal
to copyright law.
1. Common Law Obstacles. — The first set of obstacles is likely to
originate in a set of principles and doctrines that have been known to the
common law since time immemorial, and which could be reasonably
construed as extending to transactions involving copyright claims.
a. The Nonassignability of Claims. — The alienability of actionable
claims in the common law has long been a controversial topic.150 Early in
the development of the law, courts invalidated all attempts to transfer
claims, worrying that it would result in courts being overburdened with
contentious lawsuits brought by disruptive third parties.151 Over time, the
149. Examples include search engines, manufacturers of recording devices, or
makers of photocopying machinery. These might be called fair use industries. See Rogers
& Szamosszegi, supra note 69, at 32–38 (describing different fair use industries and nature
of their reliance on fair use doctrine).
150. For early works documenting the history of this development, see Cook, supra
note 126; W.S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the
Common Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 997 (1920).
151. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *442; see, e.g., Lampet’s Case, (1612) 77
Eng. Rep. 994 (K.B.) 997; 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 48a (forbidding assignment of “thing in
action” to stranger); Holdsworth, supra note 150, at 1006–09 (discussing potential for
abuse in legal systems that allow assignment of right to recover property).
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common law relaxed the stringency with which the prohibition was
applied and enforced.152 Purely personal claims were still placed under
the restriction, whereas nonpersonal ones came to be understood as
alienable.153 Since nonpersonal claims survived the death of the original
plaintiff, while personal ones were terminated (under the maxim actio
personalis moritur cum persona), alienability came to be tied to the survivability of the claim.154 And property claims, such as those relating to
trespass and conversion, were paradigmatic of nonpersonal claims.155
Two reasons seem to suggest that the historic common law rule of nonassignability is unlikely to be invoked in relation to copyright claims.
The first reason is conceptual. Given its exclusive rights framework,
copyright law is often thought of in terms of a property interest rather
than as a purely personal claim. Copyright claims are thus paradigmatic
of the kinds of claims that the common law itself came to allow assignments of in due course. Thus, even under the old rule, copyright claims
are unlikely to be seen as nonassignable.
The second reason originates in the Supreme Court’s more recent
approach to the common law rule, especially as it applies to federal statutory claims. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint Communications Co. v.
APCC Services, Inc. considered whether the common law’s general
approach to nonassignability ought to be extended to more recent statutory regimes created by Congress—and concluded against applying the
rule.156 In Sprint, the Court was presented with the question of whether
the assignee of a bare right to commence a legal claim for money, based
on a provision of the Communications Act of 1934, had standing to
commence the action.157 The original entitlement to sue was entirely
statutory in origin, and a practice had emerged wherein third parties
accumulated the claims of multiple parties and then, through an assignment, commenced actions for recovery (against the original defendants)
in their own names.158 Despite the statutory nature of the right to sue, a
majority of the Court considered the applicability of the common law,
152. Commercial considerations are believed to have been responsible for these
changes. See James Barr Ames, Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays
213 & n.3, 214 (1913) (describing how rule, which originated in doctrine of maintenance,
came to be relaxed statutorily and by case law).
153. See W.W. Allen, Annotation, Assignability of Claim in Tort for Damage to
Personal Property, 57 A.L.R.2d 603, § I.2 (1958) (“The theory that a cause of action is
assignable if it will survive to the personal representatives of the owner has gained very
wide acceptance in this country.”); Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 Vand. L.
Rev. 61, 74–75 (2011) (“The leading test of assignability is whether or not the cause of
action survives the death of the plaintiff . . . .”).
154. Sebok, supra note 153, at 75.
155. 3 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 1275 (2d ed.
1892); Sebok, supra note 153, at 76.
156. 554 U.S. 269 (2008).
157. Id. at 271–72.
158. Id.
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but concluded that the common law itself had evolved and come to
permit the assignability of claims as a default position—even when done
so exclusively to bring suit. The majority thus found that the assignee had
standing to sue.159 Sprint can thus be seen as confirming two ideas at
once: (i) that the common law’s default position is no longer one of
nonassignability and (ii) that this new default (i.e., of assignability)
extends to federal statutes.
b. Champerty and Maintenance. — In addition to its rules on nonassignability, the common law developed specialized doctrines that
policed (and continue to regulate) a third party’s involvement in bringing an actionable claim to court. The doctrines of “maintenance,”
“champerty,” and “barratry” serve this purpose.160 These rules do not
apply directly to outright transfers. Maintenance entails assisting a plaintiff in either bringing or defending a lawsuit when the person so providing the assistance “has no bona fide interest in the case.”161 It thus
involves encouraging another to bring a lawsuit, often by “‘stirring up
strife’” and assisting the person with the actual lawsuit.162 Champerty is a
species of maintenance, where one party provides assistance to another
to bring a lawsuit for consideration, usually in the form of a share of any
proceeds recovered in the suit or through settlement.163 Barratry is
“adjudicative cheerleading” wherein one person encourages an action to
be brought.164 In practice, all three usually meld into each other. As a
historical matter, the common law treated maintenance and champerty
as both crimes and torts.165 In due course, their criminal dimension
receded in importance, as did their tortious element.166 Today, courts
enforce these doctrines by rendering contractual arrangements that
partake of their characteristics as unenforceable.167
State common law courts routinely use these doctrines to regulate
lawsuits brought by third parties.168 They usually scrutinize the individual
claim brought in court to see if it is affected by the third party’s involve159. Id. at 285.
160. Sebok, supra note 153, at 98; Steinitz, Whose Claim?, supra note 1, at 1289.
161. Black’s Law Dictionary 1039 (9th ed. 2009).
162. Sebok, supra note 153, at 114 (quoting Casserleigh v. Wood, 59 P. 1024, 1027
(Colo. App. 1900)).
163. Id. at 98.
164. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 8.13, at 490 (1986).
165. For an exceptional historical overview of these doctrines and their origins, see
Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 48, 61–67 (1935).
166. Id. at 67 (“As crimes, they have become obsolete. . . . As a tort, maintenance is
more likely to be lost in such specific torts as slander, libel, conspiracy or malicious
prosecution.”).
167. See Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State
Action, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1297, 1300–01 (2002) (“[I]n most states . . . champertous
assignments are unenforceable.”).
168. For an excellent discussion of the connection between assignments and maintenance, see Sebok, supra note 153, at 94–97.

2013]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS

2315

ment. They either focus on the type of action being brought or on the
relationship between the original claimant and the investor.169 Some
states, for instance, forbid the investor from “intermeddling” in the litigation,170 others forbid third parties from getting involved in cases involving specific subject matter,171 and yet others regulate maintenance
contextually by examining the plaintiff’s real motivations for commencing the action.172
On the face of things, it may appear as though these doctrines are
unlikely to apply to copyright claims, given that they originate in state
common law while copyright disputes are always questions of federal
statutory law. Yet, the fact of the matter is that even while copyright
infringement lawsuits are a question of federal law, agreements that
govern the conditions under which the lawsuit may be brought are
matters of contract law that must necessarily be governed by state law.
Federal courts have in the past used state common law during infringement disputes and applied the doctrines of champerty and maintenance
to contractual arrangements. For example, in Refac International, Ltd. v.
Lotus Development Corp., a third party had acquired a five percent stake in
a patent “[t]o facilitate suit in [the third party’s] name as plaintiff and to
avoid the need for having [the original owner] named or brought into
the suit as a co-plaintiff.”173 The court found this arrangement to be
champertous under New York state law, and invalidated the arrangement
during an infringement lawsuit.174
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance remain an obstacle
for third party involvement not just in copyright claims, but also in other
169. See id. at 108–09 (noting “limitations based on how the maintenance is
performed” are more common than those based on “what kind of litigation is
supported”).
170. Id. at 109–12 (“[W]here a contract allows the third party to take too much
control over the conduct of what otherwise would be a meritorious suit by another, the
maintenance will be prohibited.”). Florida law is a good example here. See, e.g., Kraft v.
Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682–83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding arrangement between
brother and sister where latter had lent former money to pursue antitrust litigation in
consideration of share of any recovery not to be instance of “officious intermeddling”);
Anderson v. Trade Winds Enters. Corp., 241 So. 2d 174, 176–77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(refusing to invalidate promissory note since there was no “officious intermeddling” in
lawsuit).
171. See Sebok, supra note 153, at 108 (noting Tennessee law forbids third party
involvement in lawsuits involving land and Texas law forbids similar involvement in claims
of legal malpractice).
172. See, e.g., id. at 113–17 (observing Colorado law asks whether lawsuit would have
been brought but for third party’s involvement in deciding whether arrangement is
champertous in nature).
173. 131 F.R.D. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (first alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
174. Id.; see also Am. Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 56 F.R.D. 26, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (granting summary judgment to defendant in patent infringement suit because plaintiff was not
real party in interest).

2316

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:2277

forms of litigation. Though the doctrines have been in use for centuries,
courts and scholars have struggled to find a coherent reason for their
existence. The principal motivation behind these doctrines appears to be
the idea that litigation is something of a necessary evil, but worthy of
being avoided when possible.175 As courts have come to recognize the
absurdity of this idea, so too have they come to relax the stringency with
which the doctrines of champerty and maintenance are applied.176 It is
thus quite conceivable that in the near future, a large number of states
will come to abandon the doctrines altogether, or at least limit their
application to cases of truly frivolous litigation.
2. Copyright Law Obstacles. — Even if the common law’s traditional
rules against assignability and its doctrines of maintenance and
champerty were rendered inapplicable to copyright infringement claims,
copyright law’s internal doctrines present a host of additional (and
direct) obstacles to the realization of a market for copyright claims.
Three in particular stand out: (i) copyright law’s rule against the assignment of the right to sue—affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, (ii) copyright’s
requirement of formalities for statutory damages, and (iii) the reluctance
with which courts award defendants costs and attorney’s fees in unsuccessful infringement actions.
a. The Nonassignability of Infringement Claims. — Quite independent of
the common law’s rules on assignment, some courts have interpreted the
Copyright Act as precluding assignments of the “bare” right to sue,
independent of assignments involving the underlying copyright itself.
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Silvers v. Sony Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. crystallized this position.177 Silvers involved a plaintiff
who had produced a copyrighted work under the work for hire doctrine,
under which ownership of all rights vested with her employer.178 On
175. See, e.g., Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When
America Unleashed the Lawsuit 2–4 (1991) (observing “America’s common law
tradition . . . formerly viewed a lawsuit as an evil, at best a necessary evil”); Radin, supra
note 165, at 68–69 (describing “medieval and Christian” origin of these doctrines, in
which “litigation is at best a necessary evil” and “something to be avoided under all
circumstances”); Lyon, supra note 1, at 580 (describing how this view further posited litigation was “to be tolerated but never encouraged”).
176. See Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 731 N.E.2d 581, 582 (N.Y.
2000) (recognizing absurdity of “attempt[] to squeeze the ancient prohibition into a
modern financial transaction” via affirmative defense of champerty); Steinitz, Whose
Claim?, supra note 1, at 1289–90 (noting New York courts in particular have adopted
pragmatic approach to rule).
177. 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
178. Id. at 883. The plaintiff was the scriptwriter for the television movie The Other
Woman, which was produced by a company known as Frank and Bob Films, which owned
all the rights in the movie under the work for hire doctrine. Under copyright law, a work
made for hire is either work prepared by an employee during the course of his or her
employment or a work ordered or commissioned by someone under an agreement treating the work as a work made for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work made for
hire”). In such situations, the law treats the employer or the person ordering or
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learning that the defendant was possibly infringing the work in question
and realizing that her employer (i.e., the copyright owner) was unwilling
to commence the action, she approached her employer and obtained an
assignment of “all right, title and interest in and to any claims and causes
of action against” the named defendant and other possible infringers of
the work in question.179
Hearing the matter en banc, the Ninth Circuit found the assignment
to be invalid. The court offered four reasons for its conclusion. First, it
noted that the copyright statute vested the right to commence an
infringement action only with the “legal or beneficial owner” of the work,
which the court had in turn circumscribed through a narrowly tailored
interpretation.180 Second, it looked to the legislative history of the Act to
conclude that Congress had intended the list of assignable rights to be
exhaustive and enumerated in the Act itself.181 Congress’s failure to list
the right to sue, in other words, implied its nonassignability. Third, the
Ninth Circuit looked to patent law, copyright’s cousin, to find that in
patent law too courts had historically disallowed similar assignments of
the mere right to sue.182 Fourth, it looked to precedent from other
circuits that had similarly disapproved of such transfers.183
The court’s overall reasoning in reaching its conclusion remains
deeply problematic. In creating a set of enumerated rights and treating
them as independently assignable, Congress was doing little more than
attempting to simulate the basic structure of a property right. It was, in
the process, saying very little about the enforceability of those enumerated rights, for which it needed to create an independent provision in
the Copyright Act. That the Act specifies the mechanisms by which copyright’s exclusive rights may be transferred or assigned need not imply
that it forbids other forms of assignments. The simple point is that
assignments of claims (even copyright claims) are technically not actual
transfers of copyright, and are therefore outside the scope of the statute
to begin with. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sprint, discussed earlier,
commissioning the work as the initial owner of the copyright in the work, unless there is
an agreement to the contrary. Id. § 201(b). Despite being the creator of the work, the
plaintiff therefore had no rights in it.
179. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 883 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. at 885 (insisting such ownership be “owner[ship] of any exclusive right” in
work (emphasis added)).
181. Id. at 886–87.
182. Id. at 887–88.
183. Id. at 888–90. The court disapproved of the Fifth Circuit’s precedent to the
contrary in Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969), since the case
was decided under the Copyright Act of 1909. It instead relied on precedent from the
Second Circuit which had disapproved of such transfers. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v.
Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991) (concerning infringement of
copyrighted song); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir.
1982) (regarding infringement of Paddington Bear), superseded by statute on other
grounds.
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makes this fairly clear.184 In Sprint, the Court rightly relied on the
common law’s allowance for the assignability of claims—even when done
so exclusively to bring suit—to find that the assignee had standing to
sue.185 The mere fact that the statute in question—the Communications
Act—was silent on the point did not present the Court with a problem on
this issue. In light of this, the Ninth Circuit’s belief that a statutory
scheme somehow has to be self-contained in all respects seems rather
myopic.
The Ninth Circuit’s other reasons remain equally flawed. Copyright
and patent law derive from fundamentally different theoretical and structural rationales, which ought to have cautioned it against the ready use of
comparisons between the two. Indeed, even the Supreme Court has
cautioned against overreliance on the analogy between the two
regimes.186 In choosing precedent to follow from other circuits on the
question of assignability, the Ninth Circuit could have easily chosen a
more permissive precedent to follow instead of the one that it finally did.
The court was in the end likely motivated by the same policy concerns
that have historically informed the common law rules against the assignment of claims, even though it masked these concerns in its formalist
rhetoric.187
Other circuits seem to adopt a different position. The Fifth Circuit,
for instance, has adopted the position that assignments of accrued copyright claims are perfectly valid, present no problems under public policy,
and comply with the “real party in interest” rule.188 In fact, the Fifth
Circuit has suggested that accrued copyright infringement claims can be
treated as distinct from the copyright in the work itself, and can as a
result be owned and assigned independently.189 While this position was
framed under the 1909 Act, there seems little reason to believe that the
1976 Act changed this logic in any way or form. The Second Circuit’s
184. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 271 (2008) (“[A]n
assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal
court, even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the
assignor.”). For a more in-depth discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes
156–159.
185. Sprint, 554 U.S. at 289.
186. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (distinguishing the two
kinds of intellectual property); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 498 n.4
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (explaining difference between patent and copyright
(quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1879)). But see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201
(recognizing both patent and copyright law originate from same constitutional clause).
187. See Silvers, 402 F.3d at 893–94 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (discussing how policy
considerations favored assignment, in disagreement with majority).
188. Prather, 410 F.2d at 700. The “real party in interest” rule requires that the person
holding the substantive right that forms the basis of the cause of action be the one actually
commencing or filing the lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (“An action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”).
189. Prather, 410 F.2d at 699–700.
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position, unlike the Fifth Circuit’s, remains somewhat unclear.190 While
the majority in Silvers thought that the Second Circuit disallowed assignments of the bare right to sue,191 one of the dissents parsed the Second
Circuit’s opinions on the matter and came to the exact opposite conclusion: It found that the Second Circuit in fact permitted just such an
assignment and found it to confer standing on an assignee plaintiff.192
The dissent thus read the Second Circuit precedent to merely stand for
the proposition that an assignment of the right to sue conditioned on the
copyright holder choosing not to sue was impermissible.193 Accrued
causes of action were, in the dissent’s view, perfectly legitimate even in
the Second Circuit.194 In short, the law is fairly unclear on the permissibility of such assignments under copyright law, which in itself forms a major
obstacle.
Facilitating a market for copyright claims will of necessity require
adopting a clear rule that permits assignments of the right to sue. Given
the Supreme Court’s position in Sprint and the flawed reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit in Silvers, there is little reason to believe that this will be
hard to realize. Indeed, no circuit court has seriously revisited the issue
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint, which seemed to implicitly
override the interpretive logic of Silvers and its progeny.195 Were the issue
to surface again, the logic and holding of Sprint is likely to force courts to
validate such assignments, barring a misplaced argument that copyright
law merits differential treatment.
b. Formalities for Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees. — A robust
damages regime is central to facilitating the involvement of third parties
in copyright litigation—and copyright’s provision for statutory damages
can ideally perform that role. As noted earlier, the entry of third parties
can form a bridge between plaintiffs, who would have otherwise been
unable to access statutory damages, and such damages.196 Additionally, a
rule allowing courts to award a successful plaintiff its attorney’s fees (a
version of the English rule on fee-shifting) provides third parties with a
further incentive to fund copyright plaintiffs. Yet, under current law, the
availability of both statutory damages and attorney’s fees depends
190. Compare Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d
Cir. 1982) (noting licensee’s ability to sue in own name without joining copyright owner),
superseded by statute on other grounds, with ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music,
Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding if accrued causes of action are not
expressly included in assignment assignee cannot bring such actions).
191. 402 F.3d at 889–90.
192. Id. at 909–11 (Bea, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 909 (finding Second Circuit’s rule to be “copyright holder who maintains
ownership of the exclusive right to reproduce cannot assign to a third party the bare right
to sue should the copyright holder choose not to do so” (emphasis omitted)).
194. Id.
195. See Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2013) (reaffirming
holding of Silvers without discussing Sprint).
196. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing statutory damages as incentive for funding).
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entirely on actions undertaken by the copyright owner well in advance of
the litigation, or indeed the third party’s entry into the picture. Section
412 of the Copyright Act renders the availability of these remedies (for a
published work) contingent on the copyright owner having registered
the work within three months from the first publication of the work
when the infringement commences before registration.197 In effect, the
copyright owner needs to register the work prior to the commencement
of the infringement for statutory damages and attorney’s fees to remain
available.198 The legislative history accompanying this provision indicates
that it was introduced in order to “induce” adherence to copyright’s
formalities once they were rendered optional.199 The idea was to prevent
recourse to copyright’s special remedies in situations where the
infringement had occurred prior to registration, and the three-month
duration was intended to operate as a “grace period.”200
Section 412 is likely to reduce—rather drastically—a third party’s
willingness to be involved in copyright litigation, since a large majority of
copyright owners are unlikely to register their works prior to first publication or even shortly thereafter.201 This provision is in contrast to § 411,
which mandates that the work be registered prior to the commencement
of the infringement action, but not necessarily before the infringement
itself.202
In an ideal world, the stringency of § 412 would be relaxed, and it
would come to operate along the lines of § 411—requiring registration
prior to commencing the lawsuit and not earlier. Alternatively, the “grace
197. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). The section provides:
In any action under this title . . . no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s
fees, as provided by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for—
(1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced before
the effective date of its registration; or
(2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work
and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made
within three months after the first publication of the work.
Id.
198. 2 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 4, § 7.16[C][1][a].
199. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 158 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5774 (“Copyright registration for published works . . . [will] no longer be compulsory, and
should therefore be induced in some practical way.”). Copyright formalities—registration,
notice, and deposit—are treated by the 1976 Act as purely optional and in no way affect
copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 407(a), 408 (treating deposit as optional and registration as permissive).
200. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 158.
201. Under current copyright law, registration is completely unnecessary in order to
obtain copyright protection for a work. It is merely a formal prerequisite to commencing a
lawsuit. Consequently, most copyright owners today hardly ever register their work until
the prospect of a lawsuit emerges.
202. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (providing “no civil action for infringement of the copyright
in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with” Copyright Act).
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period” might be extended, especially given the periodic term extensions
that copyright law has seen over the years,203 which rely on the assumption that creative works hold value for longer and longer periods of
time.204 Yet, legislative modification of § 412 is highly unlikely, and will
likely have to accompany a broader reform of copyright’s statutory
damages regime.205 The net effect of the provision and the possibility of
third party funding is therefore likely to accrue to authors (i.e., creators)
who worry about high litigation costs and about being unable to litigate
an infringement suit on their own, who then choose to register their
works voluntarily merely in order to preserve the option of enticing third
party funders to acquire their claims in due course. In the short term,
then, § 412 will serve to deter the entry of third parties into copyright
litigation; in the medium term, however, it is likely to induce a greater
number of creators to register their works hoping to entice third parties.
As the involvement of third parties grows, and copyright owners are able
to anticipate the kinds of claims that the market best responds to, § 412 is
likely to produce an equilibrium where works most suited to third party
funding come to be registered.
c. Defendants and Fee-Shifting. — As discussed earlier, third party
funding can come to benefit defendants in copyright infringement law203. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195–97 (2003) (describing
Congress’s practice of extending copyright’s term retroactively).
204. Cf. id. at 206–07 (“Congress passed [term extensions] in light of demographic,
economic, and technological changes and rationally credited projections that longer
terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public
distribution of their works.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
205. Any modification to § 412 suggested here would certainly have to accompany
other reforms to copyright’s regime of statutory damages, as others have already noted.
See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 75, at 509–10 (documenting problems with copyright’s statutory damages regime and suggesting potential legislative reforms). As currently
operationalized, courts award plaintiffs statutory damages simply upon request, without
any inquiry into the purpose of the award. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (“[T]he copyright
owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of
actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages . . . .”). This practice undoubtedly originated in the Copyright Act’s fusion of compensatory and punitive purposes into
a single award of statutory damages. The author has elsewhere argued that this reality has
encouraged the emergence of copyright trolls and that the only way to curb their activities
is by reforming copyright’s regime of statutory damages by making a court’s award of such
damages contingent upon a plaintiff’s showing that it suffered some injury of the kind that
would have triggered copyright law’s very need to award damages. See Balganesh, Uneasy
Case, supra note 6, at 736–38 (describing phenomenon of trolling and its reliance on
statutory damages). This regime would in principle track antitrust law’s “antitrust injury”
rule, and serve to ensure that the regime is not misused opportunistically. Id. at 770–73.
Expanding the allowance for statutory damages by relaxing the requirement in § 412
would thus have to accompany the introduction of this safeguard, so as to ensure that the
entry of third parties seeking to fund legitimate claims does not exacerbate the problem of
copyright trolling. Cf. James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of
Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 79, 110
(2012) (claiming “statutory damages give copyright holders the incentive to litigate over
such small losses,” thereby creating “a flood of litigation”).
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suits as well, by moving the risk of litigation away from them through a
mechanism of insurance.206 For this to work, however, third parties need
a somewhat strong incentive to acquire such risk. In the ordinary scheme
of things, American law does not allow courts to award a successful party
(plaintiff or defendant) attorney’s fees, but instead requires each side to
bear its own lawyering costs.207 The copyright statute is, however, an
exception to this. Section 505 of the Act gives the court “discretion” to
award the recovery of “full costs” to a party and “reasonable attorney’s
fees” to a successful party in an infringement lawsuit.208 On the face of
things, § 505 draws no distinction between a plaintiff and defendant
regarding the court’s exercise of its discretion.209 Yet, as a historical
matter, several courts tended to make such awards to plaintiffs rather
than defendants and even adopted rules to this effect, which came to be
known as the “dual approach.”210
In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., the Supreme Court clarified that successful
defendants must be treated no differently from successful plaintiffs with
respect to awards of attorney’s fees.211 Central to the Court’s conclusion
was the recognition that defendants too needed to be given an incentive
to defend themselves.212 It thus explicitly noted that “defendants who
seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be
encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.”213 Encouraging
defendants to contest the claim through litigation, rather than settling,
was thus central to the Court’s holding, and something that third party
funding will stimulate.
Despite the Court’s holding in Fogerty, as a practical matter defendants rarely ever succeed in being awarded costs and attorney’s fees, even

206. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text (discussing ability of third party
involvement to reduce frivolous claims).
207. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(“In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”).
208. 17 U.S.C. § 505.
209. Id. It provides:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the
recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an
officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also
award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.
Id.
210. See 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 4, § 14.10[D][2][a] (“[A] number of
courts developed the rule that a prevailing plaintiff should be awarded fees routinely.”).
211. 510 U.S. 517, 523 (1994). The Court based its holding that § 505 requires courts
to treat prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants alike on the legislative history and
wording of the provision.
212. Id. at 527.
213. Id.
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if they prevail in the lawsuit.214 The reason for this originates in the
Court’s own reasoning. In order to preserve lower courts’ discretion on
when to make such awards, the Court identified the use of factors such as
“‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness’” and ideals of
“‘compensation and deterrence.’”215 As a result of this observation, courts
in most jurisdictions remain unwilling to award defendant’s attorney’s
fees unless convinced of the plaintiff’s blameworthiness or culpability in
bringing the suit.216 As long as a plaintiff has a reasonable copyright
claim, such culpability is extremely hard to establish—and is usually
associated with “bad faith motivation,” “hard-ball tactics,” or “objective
unreasonableness.”217 The net effect is thus that both Fogerty and § 505’s
limited move away from the traditional American rule have meant very
little to defendants in practice. This will likely put a major damper on the
role that third party funding can play for defendants.
Overcoming this obstacle is entirely up to courts, and requires treating the fair use defense as something that the plaintiff ought to factor
into its decision of whether to bring the infringement suit. One court has
already taken this position and found fault with the plaintiff when the
defendant had a valid fair use defense.218 The court thus treated a plaintiff’s insistence on pursuing a claim when the defendant had a valid fair
use defense as objectively unreasonable and potentially frivolous.219 To
be sure, not all courts take this position, and indeed one has even taken
the view that a defendant’s risk taking (by copying) required the defendant to bear its own attorney’s costs and expenses.220 A uniform rule would
thus be one that treats a defendant’s colorable fair use defense—when
ascertainable in advance—as a basis for invoking § 505. It would also
require the plaintiff to bear the defendant’s full litigation costs, including its attorney’s fees. In some ways, this approach derives support from
the very structure of the copyright owner’s (i.e., the plaintiff’s) basic
entitlement, under which the set of exclusive rights is “subject to” the fair
214. See 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 4, § 14.10[D][3][b] (“[M]ost courts
deny fees to prevailing defendants when the plaintiffs’ claims were not motivated by bad
faith.”).
215. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19 (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d
151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986)).
216. 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 4, § 14.10[D][3][a].
217. Id. § 14.10[D][3][b].
218. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., No. CV99-8543RSWL(RZX), 2004
WL 1454100, at *1–*2 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2004) (finding defendant’s parodic use of plaintiff’s toy designs in its photographs to be fair use and concluding “Plaintiff’s arguments,
therefore, lack factual or legal support, making Plaintiff’s copyright claims objectively
unreasonable and frivolous in light of the fair use exception”).
219. Id.
220. See Blanch v. Koons, 485 F. Supp. 2d 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (refusing to
award defendant reasonable attorney’s fees because defendant was “appropriation artist”
and such artists “must accept the risks of defense, including the time, effort, and expenses
involved”).
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use defense (among other exceptions).221 Some scholars have used this
language to suggest that the plaintiff ought to bear the burden of establishing that the defendant’s use is not a fair use to begin with.222 At the
very least, the plaintiff ought to bear the risk of incurring the other side’s
full litigation costs, even if not the actual burden of establishing the
absence of fair use.223
CONCLUSION
The copyright system today is in a state of deep crisis. In its current
form, it imposes enormous costs on society, with its limited benefits
flowing to a small minority of creators and users. And yet, those attempting to reform the system remain largely unwilling to think creatively to
bring about fundamental change. Specifically, the possibility that
solutions to some of the system’s problems can come from the market,
rather than from doctrinal reform, remains largely unexplored. This
Essay has argued that facilitating a regulated market for copyright
infringement claims, where third parties can acquire or invest in
infringement or fair use claims in court, might make the system more
egalitarian, less inefficient, and likely to thereby serve its goal of inducing
221. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
222. See Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31
Cardozo L. Rev. 1781, 1807–08 (2010) (“A copyright holder’s general burden of
demonstrating that a defendant’s use falls within the scope of the holder’s rights should
require the copyright holder to demonstrate that the defendant’s use is not fair.”).
223. An additional reform, beyond ensuring that prevailing defendants can shift costs
to plaintiffs, is the potential expansion of the “copyright misuse” doctrine to allow defendants to, after prevailing in the infringement lawsuit, commence an action for damages
against the losing plaintiff. As interpreted today, the copyright misuse doctrine is by and
large treated as an equitable defense that allows defendants to avoid infringement claims
by showing that the plaintiff’s behavior misuses the copyright privilege—either by enforcing it inequitably, in an anticompetitive manner, or to the detriment of copyright’s safeguards. See Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of
Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 865, 880–902 (2000) (“[T]he common law development of copyright misuse has
yielded two schools—(1) courts that apply a ‘public policy approach’ to assessing misuse,
and (2) courts that apply an ‘antitrust approach.’”); Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking
Copyright Misuse, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 903–35 (2004) (“Copyright misuse can arise . . .
when a copyright holder uses rights granted to him under the Copyright Act in a manner
that violates federal antitrust law [or] when a copyright holder attempts to extend his
copyright . . . in a manner that violates the public policy embodied in copyright law.”).
The doctrine thus has not yet fully allowed defendants to counterclaim for damages. While
courts certainly should not make a § 505 recovery contingent on a showing of misuse, an
independent misuse claim that allows defendants to sue for actual damages could conceivably support the working of § 505. The effect of such a doctrine would be to actively
encourage third parties to invest in defendants’ fair use defenses (or insure them after the
fact), especially when the claim is without merit to begin with, in the hope of obtaining a
windfall through a counterclaim for misuse. While this reform is unlikely to be brought
into effect in the near future, those who discuss § 505 would do well to consider its connection to the misuse doctrine.
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creativity. Accepting this, of course, requires recognizing that litigation is
not an unavoidable reality of the copyright system, but rather a central
analytical and functional part of how it works, a mindset that scholars
and courts have thus far resisted.
Once litigation is seen as part of the solution rather than as part of
the problem, harnessing the resources and expertise that third parties
can bring to copyright law can become a powerful source of reform for
the system. To be sure, claim markets are unlikely to solve all of copyright’s problems, many of which will indeed require doctrinal changes.
At the very least though, scholars and courts should recognize that such
markets form a legitimate part of the conversation about copyright
reform.
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